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The Geography of Racial Stereotyping:
Evidence and Implications for VRA
Preclearance After Shelby County
Christopher S. Elmendorf*
Douglas M. Spencer**
The Supreme Court in Shelby County v. Holder (2013)
effectively enjoined the preclearanceregime of the Voting Rights Act.
The Court deemed the coverage formula, which determines the
jurisdictions subject to preclearance, insufficiently grounded in
current conditions. This Article proposes a new, legally defensible
approach to coverage based on between-state differences in the
proportion of voting age citizens who subscribe to negative
stereotypes about racial minorities and who vote accordingly. The
new coverage formula could also account for racially polarized
voting and minority population size, but, for constitutional reasons,
subjective discrimination by voters is the essential criterion. We
demonstrate that the racial-stereotyping, polarized-voting, and
population-size criteria would yield similarpatterns of coverage, at
least with respect to African Americans, and we show, ironically,that
the new pattern of coverage would coincide with historic coverage
under the "outdated" formula invalidated by Shelby County.
Recently developed statistical techniques permit the new coverage
formula to be further refined based on estimates of racial
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stereotyping within substate geographic units, such as cities and
counties. We suggest that Congress establish default rules for
coverage based on our state-level results, and delegate authority to
make substate coverage determinations to an administrative agency
(along with other responsibilitiesfor keeping the coverage formula
up to date). Finally,we show that if Congress does not act, the courts
could use our results to reestablish coverage in a number of states,
entering much broader "bail in" remedies for constitutional
violations than would otherwise bejustified.
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CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: General, is it-is it the government's
submission that the citizens in the South are more racist than citizens
in the North?
GENERAL VERRILLI: It is not, and I do not know the answer to that,
Your Honor.
INTRODUCTION

In a decision as foreseeable as it was momentous, 2 the Supreme Court in
Shelby County v. Holdereffectively enjoined the preclearance regime ("Section
5") of the Voting Rights Act (VRA). Section 5 had prevented certain states
and localities from changing election procedures without prior approval from
the federal government. The Court determined that Congress had not
sufficiently tied the coverage formula, which defines the jurisdictions subject to
preclearance, to "current conditions.'A Shelby County left standing the VRA's
main nationally applicable provision, the results test of Section 2, but it too is in
jeopardy.5 Section 2 has been repeatedly narrowed via textually doubtful
statutory constructions that rest on the constitutional avoidance canon.6
The Supreme Court's VRA jurisprudence is unified by a sense that neither
the preclearance regime of Section 5 nor the results test of Section 2 is welltailored to remedy constitutionally prohibited race discrimination in the
electoral process. The VRA was adopted to enforce the Fourteenth and
Fifteenth Amendments, which proscribe only subjective racial discrimination
by state actors. Yet the geographic reach of Section 5 and the standards for
liability under Section 2 seem to bear at best an attenuated connection to the
forms of discrimination the Constitution prohibits.
In this Article, which concerns Section 5, and in a companion article on
Section 2,' we argue that the VRA's constitutional difficulties can be resolved
using data on the geography of voter discrimination. By "geography of voter
discrimination," we mean the relative propensity of citizens in different
1. Transcript of Oral Argument at 41-42, Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013)
(No. 12-96).
2. See infra notes 16-18 and accompanying text.
3. Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013).
4. Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, No. 12-96, slip op. at 21 (U.S. June 25, 2013).
5. See Luis Fuentes-Rohwer, The FutureofSection 2 of the Voting Rights Act in the Hands of
a Conservative Court, 5 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL'Y 125 (2010); Richard L. Hasen, Shelby
County and the Illusion of Minimalism 17-18 (UC Irvine Sch. of Law Legal Studies Research Paper
Series No. 2013-116, 2013).
6. Christopher S. Elmendorf, Making Sense of Section 2: Of Biased Votes, Unconstitutional
Elections, and Common Law Statutes, 160 U. PA. L. REv. 377, 379-91, 399-403 (2012) [hereinafter
Elmendorf, Making Sense ofSection 2] (discussing cases).
7. Christopher S. Elmendorf & Douglas M. Spencer, After Shelby County: Getting Section 2
of the Voting Rights Act to Do the Work of Section 5 (2014) (UC Davis Legal Studies Research Paper
No. 372, 2014), availableat http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=2414652.
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geographic units to vote on the basis of racial motives or criteria that the
Constitution disallows for state action. Though the individual voter is not a
state actor, voter discrimination increases the risk of unconstitutional state
action and therefore justifies remedial legislation under Congress's power to
enforce the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments.
The available data on voter discrimination as such are limited and
problematic, but there are very good data on a decent proxy: racial
stereotyping. Recently developed statistical techniques allow these data to be
used to estimate racial attitudes within small geographic units, such as cities,
counties, and legislative districts.
Part I of this Article examines the Supreme Court's objections to the
extant coverage formula for Section 5 and explains why Congress-if it wishes
to resuscitate Section 5--ought to ground the new formula on current evidence
of subjective racial discrimination by voters. Though we are sympathetic to
recent proposals for linking coverage to political polarization between racial
groups, or to the size of the minority population, we argue that these
approaches may be legally vulnerable because they track a type of
discrimination that can be characterized as constitutionally innocuous
political-as opposed to racial-discrimination. Racial polarization and
minority population size are probably best treated as "plus factors" for
coverage, rather than as substitutes for evidence of voter discrimination. 8
Part II turns to more technical matters: the choice among measures of
voter discrimination; the analytics for obtaining state- and local-level estimates
of opinion and behavior from national surveys; and the options for aggregating
population characteristics, such as the distribution of racial attitudes, into onedimensional scales that can be used to rank states or localities for coverage
purposes. We defend a proxy for voter discrimination derived from survey
questions that ask respondents to rate members of a racial group "in general" in
terms of their work effort, intelligence, and trustworthiness. This measure has
face validity, and it explains political preferences.
Part III presents results on racial stereotyping within states and individual
congressional districts using two analytic methods. The first method,
disaggregation, requires no modeling assumptions. It generates reasonably
precise estimates at the state level but not for geographic units within states.
The alternative to disaggregation, multilevel regression with poststratification
(MRP), requires modeling but yields estimates within small geographic units,
such as cities, counties, and legislative districts.

8.
understood
"constitute
Thornburg

Throughout this Article, we will use the term "racial polarization" as the Gingles plurality
it: "Racial polarization" exists if and only if members of the racial groups in question
[] politically cohesive unit[s]," who generally vote "as a bloc" in opposition to one another.
v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 56 (1984) (plurality opinion).
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Our central finding is that the recently invalidated coverage formula
actually did a remarkably good job of picking out states whose non-black
residents harbor exceptionally negative stereotypes of African Americans. We
also show that our ranking of states by anti-black stereotyping correlates very
highly-but not perfectly-with rankings based on black population share and
racially polarizing voting in the 2008 presidential election. This convergence
result is fortuitous. It means that Congress could enact a new coverage formula
justified in several different ways, with each justification serving distinct legal
and political constituencies. And, because of slight variations in state ranking
under each criterion, Congress would be able to accommodate political
exigencies by adjusting the cutoffs for coverage or weights assigned to each
criterion.
Part IV summarizes our recommendations to Congress. Taking stock of
legal uncertainties and the prospect for new and better data going forward, we
propose that Congress enact a default coverage formula based on our state-level
results, and authorize the Department of Justice or a new administrative body to
update the coverage formula prospectively using new data and results on voter
discrimination in substate geographic units.
But what if Congress doesn't act? Part V explains how our findings could
be used to recreate coverage through state-specific litigation. A rarely used
provision of the VRA authorizes courts to impose preclearance as a remedy for
constitutional violations. The logic of Shelby County requires such "bail in"
remedies to be used sparingly and drafted narrowly, unless it can be shown that
conditions in the defendant jurisdiction present an unusual risk of Fourteenth
and Fifteenth Amendment violations. By showing that most of the formerly
covered states really are different from other states, we provide the necessary
predicate for broad bail-in remedies. Our results can be used to answer the
liability-stage question of whether unconstitutional race discrimination actually
occurred.
One caveat before we begin: we will not mount a normative defense of the
preclearance regime. That argument has been made (and of course disputed) by
many others.9 Our goal here is simply to show how the regime can be put back
to work after Shelby County.
I.
SECTION 5 AFTER SHELBY COUNTY

This Part introduces Section 5 and then turns to the Supreme Court's
decision in Shelby County. We explain why the logic of Shelby County, given
current understandings of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments, favors a
9. Compare, e.g., Michael J. Pitts, Let's Not Call the Whole Thing OffJust Yet: A Response to
Samuel Issacharoffs Suggestion to Scuttle Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act, 84 NEB. L. REv. 605
(2005), with Samuel Issacharoff, Is Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act a Victim of Its Own Success?,
104 COLUM. L. REv. 1710 (2004).
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new coverage formula based on population demographics and voter
preferences. We make the case for treating racial discrimination by voters as
the linchpin for coverage, and we discuss the limitations of some leading
alternatives, such as basing coverage on direct evidence of minority political
incorporation (e.g., voter turnout rates and the election of minority candidates)
or data on Section 2 violations.
A. Section 5 and the Supreme Court

Section 5 of the VRA requires certain states and localities-the so-called
"covered jurisdictions"-to obtain permission from the U.S. Department of
Justice or the District Court for the District of Columbia before making any
changes to a "voting qualification or prerequisite to voting, or standard,
practice, or procedure with respect to voting."' 0 Covered jurisdictions bear the
burden of proving that their proposed change is not discriminatorily motivated
and will not diminish the opportunity of minority voters to elect their "preferred
candidates of choice.""
Originally a temporary measure, Section 5 has been extended repeatedly,
most recently in 2006 for another twenty-five years.12 When Congress debated
the 2006 amendments, legal scholars warned that the extension of Section 5
might be struck down unless Congress updated the coverage formula to reflect
current conditions in the states.' 3 For many years, the coverage formula had
been based primarily on between-state differences in voter registration and
turnout during the early 1970s, and the use of "tests or devices" as a

10. 42 U.S.C. §1973(c)(a) (2006).
11. Id §1973(c)(b).
12. Fannie Lou Hamer, Rosa Parks, and Coretta Scott King Voting Rights Reauthorization
and Amendments Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-246, 120 Stat. 577 (codified at 42 U.S.C.
§§ 1971 -1973aa-la (2006)).
13. See, e.g., Understanding the Benefits and Costs of Section 5 Pre-Clearance:Hearing
Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. (2006) (statement of Nathaniel Persily,

Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania School of Law) ("[T]he coverage formula or trigger
found in section 4 of the VRA, while never having perfectly captured the universe ofjurisdictions that
deserve suspicion, has become more over and underinclusive since 1982 ... [and] it is far from clear
that renewing section 5 with the outdated coverage formula would be constitutional."); The Continuing
Need for Section 5 Pre-Clearance:Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong.

200 (2006) (statement of Richard H. Pildes, Sudler Family Professor of Law, New York University
School of Law) (expressing "fundamental constitutional and policy concern regarding whether the
evidence in the record is sufficient to justify re-authorizing Section 5 in its current form"); An
Introduction to the Expiring Provisions of the Voting Rights Act and Legal Issues Relating to
Reauthorization: Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 8, 10 (2006)

(statement of Richard L. Hasen, William H. Hannon Distinguished Professor of Law, Loyola Los
Angeles School of Law) ("I urge the Committee to spend the time to craft a bill that will both pass
constitutional muster in the Supreme Court and do the important work of continuing to protect
minority voting rights in this country.... The proposed amendments would not update this formula in
any way.").
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prerequisite to voting prior to the enactment of the VRA in 1965. Covered
states were those with low turnout and a history of impeding voting.'s This
formula was reverse engineered as a facially neutral mechanism for identifying
most of the states in the former Jim Crow South.16 The problem facing
Congress in 2006 was that covered and non-covered states looked similar in
terms of minority political participation.' 7 "[I]t turned out to be an impossible
task" to find a new formula that would "capture an appropriate group of
jurisdictions while passing constitutional muster and not giving rise to
concerted political opposition."' 8 So Congress left the coverage formula
untouched, figuring that its historical pedigree and connection to Jim Crow
gave it better odds in the courts than any shot-in-the-dark alternative.' 9
Conservative jurists have not looked kindly on this decision. In the
Supreme Court's first opinion about the newly extended Section 5, Chief
Justice Roberts declared, "Things have changed in the South." 20 The Court
avoided deciding the constitutionality of Section 5, but warned, "[T]he Act
imposes current burdens and must be justified by current needs."2' Jim Crow
history was not enough. Congress did not answer this invitation to update the
coverage formula, and in Shelby County v. Holder, a five-Justice majority held
that Section 5 could not be enforced unless or until Congress revisits the
coverage question. 22
Though Shelby County dodged an important question about the standard
of review,23 its central message is clear: if Congress wants to compel certain
states to obtain the federal government's approval before implementing
changes to their election laws, Congress must make plain how the formula used
to select those states (using current data) tracks the constitutional harms that
Congress means to remedy.
Consider the Court's casual dismissal of the massive record that Congress
had amassed about voting problems and racial polarization in the covered
jurisdictions. For the majority, it was essentially irrelevant whether the full
14.

See About Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/vot/sec_5/about.php (last visited June 18, 2014).
i5.

Id

16. Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 679 F.3d 848, 878-79 (D.C. Cir. 2012), rev'd, 133 S. Ct. 2612
(2013) ("As the district court explained, the election years that serve as coverage "triggers" under
section 4(b) were never selected because of something special that occurred in those years. Instead,
Congress identified the jurisdictions it sought to cover-those for which it had evidence of actual
voting discrimination-and then worked backward, reverse-engineering a formula to cover those
jurisdictions.") (internal quotations and citations omitted).
17.

Nathaniel Persily, The Promise and Pitfalls of the New Voting Rights Act, 117 YALE L.J.

174, 192-207 (2007).
18. Id. at 209.
19. Id.at209-ll.
20. Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Holder, 557 U.S. 193, 202 (2009).
21. Id. at 203 (emphasis added).
22. Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013).
23. See Hasen, supra note 5, at I1-18.
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record before Congress in 2006 established that voting discrimination remains
worse in covered than non-covered jurisdictions. 24 The "fundamental problem,"
wrote Chief Justice Roberts, is that "Congress did not use the record it
compiled to shape a coverage formula grounded in current conditions."25 That
Congress amassed numerous examples of "second-generation barriers" to
political participation in the covered jurisdictions, such as electoral district
boundaries that dilute minority voting power, "simply highlights the
irrationality of continued reliance on the [extant] coverage formula, which is
based on voting tests and access to the ballot, not vote dilution." 26
Courts applying Shelby County will assess any new coverage formula that
Congress may enact not by whether it results in a defensible categorization of
states, but by whether the formula (1) uses current data, and (2) bears a facially
evident relationship-a "logical relationship" 27 -to the constitutional injuries
that Congress means to remedy or prevent. Perhaps the underlying concern is
one of legitimacy: the statute establishing coverage must make it clear to
citizens in the covered jurisdictions why their state has been singled out, and
how this singling out serves to prevent constitutional violations. 28
B. Why Coverage Must Be Based on Societal Risk Factorsfor Racially
DiscriminatoryState Action 29

In the run-up to Shelby County and in its immediate aftermath, legal
scholars proposed a number of "current conditions" that might justify singling
out a group of states for Section 5 coverage. Broadly speaking, there are three
general proposals: (1) link coverage to geographic variation in Section 2
litigation, in effect treating Section 2 violations as a proxy for unconstitutional

24. The evidence and what it means is briefly discussed-and then dismissed-at page 21 of
the slip opinion. Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, No. 12-96, slip op. at 21 (U.S. June 25, 2013).
25. Id.
26. Id For other passages speaking to this point, see id. at 17 (noting that the coverage formula
was "rational in both practice and theory" in 1965, as it "looked to cause (discriminatory tests) and
effect (low voter registration and turnout), and tailored the remedy (preclearance) to those jurisdictions
exhibiting both"). See also id. at 20 ("The coverage formula that Congress reauthorized in 2006
ignores [the abolishment of voting tests, and the erasure of differences in registration and turnout
between covered and non-covered jurisdictions], keeping the focus on decades-old data relevant to
decades-old problems, rather than current data reflecting current needs.").
27.
28.

Id. at 18.
Cf Christopher S. Elmendorf, Empirical Legitimacy and Election Law, in RACE, REFORM,

AND REGULATION OF THE ELECTORAL PROCESS: RECURRING PUZZLES IN AMERICAN DEMOCRACY

117 (Guy-Uriel E. Charles et al. eds., 2011) (examining the role of legitimacy concerns in the Supreme
Court's election law jurisprudence). We are indebted to Jack Chin for suggesting that the Shelby
County decision can also be understood in this way.
29. Portions of this section draw on a commentary we published in Slate. Christopher S.
Elmendorf & Douglas M. Spencer, How to Save the Voting Rights Act, SLATE (July 17, 2013, 3:11

PM), http://www.slate.com/articles/newsand-politics/jurisprudence/2013/07/voting-rights
.congress can_save_it.html.

acthow
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discrimination; (2) link coverage to geographic variation in minority political
incorporation, as measured by voter registration and turnout rates, the election
of minority candidates, etc.; and (3) link coverage to geographic variation in
minority population size and racially polarized voting.
As we explain here, the first two approaches are constitutionally
vulnerable, and the third approach is doubtful too unless the formula takes
account of preferences or beliefs that the Constitution disallows as the basis for
state action. The fundamental problem is that the Fourteenth and Fifteenth
Amendments are violated only by intentionally discriminatory state action.30
When the VRA was enacted in 1965, certain familiar devices of intentional
discrimination, such as literacy tests and related prerequisites to voting, were
still in widespread use throughout the South. Section 5 coverage was tied to
those devices. There exists no present-day analogue for anchoring a postShelby County coverage formula.

It won't suffice to base coverage simply on low minority turnout, or lack
of minority candidate success, since these are indicia of discriminatory results
rather than discriminatory intent (and, in any event, between-state differences
in minority voter participation and candidate success are almost certainly
endogenous to the history of Section 5 coverage). We recognize that
discriminatory intent is likely to generate discriminatory results. In a weak
sense, low rates of minority participation may evidence discriminatory intent,
but the modem Supreme Court has been hostile to results tests in
antidiscrimination law.32 If a results test is to serve as a "danger sign" of
discriminatory intent, 33 it must, at the very least, be coupled with evidence that
the state is administering its elections in some unusual and poorly justified
manner. But unusual, poorly justified election laws with a severely disparate
impact are likely to violate Section 2 of the VRA.34 So they are rare. It is

30. See, e.g., Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613 (1982); City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55
(1980); Pers. Adm'r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256 (1979); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229
(1976).
31. Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, No. 12-96, slip op. at 3-4, 12-13 (U.S. June 25, 2013).
32. See, e.g., Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557 (2009). As Richard Primus notes, the Supreme
Court's sense that results tests (as applied to state actors) may themselves violate equal protection
norms "represents a complete turnabout in antidiscrimination law." Richard Primus, The Future of
DisparateImpact, 108 MICH. L. REv. 1341 (2010).

33. Cf City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 532 (1997) (recognizing that Congress may
enact overbroad remedial legislation under the Fourteenth Amendment so long as there is a
"significant likelihood" that the prohibited activity would violate the Constitution); Christopher S.
Elmendorf, Structuring JudicialReview of ElectoralMechanics: Explanations and Opportunities,156

U. PA. L. REV. 313, 324 (2007) (noting that the Supreme Court in electoral mechanics cases has varied
the intensity of review depending on danger signs of constitutional violations).
34. Legal standards under Section 2 are murky, but the courts generally consider a broad range
of factors concerning the history, effects, context, and rationale for the challenged measure. See
generally Ellen Katz et al., DocumentingDiscriminationin Voting: JudicialEndings Under Section 2
of the Voting Rights Act Since 1982, 39 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 643 (2006) (summarizing Section 2

jurisprudence).
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therefore infeasible for Congress to craft a new coverage formula modeled on
the test-or-device-plus-low-turnout approach of the VRA's drafters.
Perhaps in recognition of this, Ellen Katz, Peyton McCrary, Morgan
Kousser, and Bernie Grofman have suggested that Section 5 coverage might be
tied to a state's history of Section 2 violations.3 5 Katz and McCrary focus on
geographic disparities in the probability of litigant success and favorable
settlements. Kousser and Grofman focus on the total number of violations and
settlements within each geographic unit. Either approach would be
vulnerable.36 The legal standards for liability under Section 2 are fuzzy, and
bear an uncertain relationship at best to the risk of Fourteenth and Fifteenth
Amendment violations.37 Given the constitutional doubts the Supreme Court's
conservatives have expressed about the results test of Section 2, it would be
playing with fire for Congress to tie Section 5 coverage to the history of
successful Section 2 claims.
Moreover, as Adam Cox and Thomas Miles explain, there is no necessary
or consistent relationship between the probability of litigant success and the
35. Id; Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 811 F. Supp. 2d 424 (D.D.C. 2011), affd, 679 F.3d 848 (D.C.
Cir. 2012), rev'd, 133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013) (citing Peyton McCrary et al., The End ofPreclearanceAs
We Knew It: How the Supreme Court Transformed Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act, 11 MICH. J.
RACE & L. 275 (2006)); Bernard Grofnan, Devising a Sensible Triggerfor Section 5 of the Voting
Rights Act, 12 ELECTION L.J. 332 (2013); Ellen D. Katz & Anna Baldwin, Why Counting Votes
Doesn't Add Up: A Response to Cox and Miles' Judging the Voting Rights Act, 108 COLUM. L. REv.
SIDEBAR 23 (2008); Morgan Kousser, Gutting the Landmark Civil Rights Legislation, REUTERS BLOG

(June 26, 2013), http://blogs.reuters.com/great-debate/2013/06/26/gutting-the-landmark-civil-rightslegislation/.
36. A totally different approach would be to give up on a general coverage formula based on
current or past conduct, and instead to make preclearance a supplemental remedy for particular future
Section 2 violations. For proposals to this effect, see Travis Crum, The Voting Rights Act's Secret
Weapon: Pocket Trigger Litigation and Dynamic Preclearance, 119 YALE L.J. 1992 (2010); Justin
Levitt, Shadowboxing and Unintended Consequences, SCOTUSBLOG (June 25, 2013, 10:39 PM),

http://www.scotusblog.com/2013/06/shadowboxing-and-unintended-consequences/; Spencer Overton,
How To Update the Voting Rights Act, HUFFPOsT BLOG (June 25, 2013,

12:52 PM),

http://www.huffmgtonpost.com/spencer-overton/how-to-update-the-voting-.b_3497350.html;

Richard

Pildes, One Easy, But Powerful, Way to Amend the VRA, ELECTION LAW BLOG (June 28, 2013, 6:53

AM), http://electionlawblog.org/?p-52349.
We think this approach would be viable ifjudges were required to make a determination about the
risk of future constitutional violations before imposing the remedy of coverage. The resulting pattern
of coverage would, however, probably be pretty limited. We think most judges would be reluctant to
issue preclearance remedies that go much beyond the conduct at issue in the case-unless the plaintiff
made a strong showing that circumstances in the defendant jurisdiction present an exceptional risk of
constitutional violations. Cf E-mail from John Tanner, former chief of the voting rights section at the
Department of Justice, to law-election@department-lists.uci.edu (July 10, 2013) (on file with author)
(noting that judicial bail-in remedies under Section 3 of the VRA have generally been limited in this
way); see also infra Part V (explaining how our results on the geography of voter discrimination could
be used to shape broader bail-in remedies for certain jurisdictions). And we suspect that the Roberts
Court would not accept what it has called the "extraordinary" remedy of preclearance as an automatic
remedy for Section 2 violations-at least not unless Congress first amends the standard for liability
under Section 2 to better connect it to actual or threatened constitutional violations.
37.

See Elmendorf, Making Sense ofSection 2, supra note 6, at 387-95.
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frequency of legal violations. Success rates can vary hugely depending on the
relative risk aversion of plaintiffs and defendants, available legal resources, etc.
As for the total number of successful Section 2 claims (Kousser's measure),
this probably has as much to do with political incentives for litigation and
settlement as it does with race discrimination. Samuel Issacharoff has observed
that political parties, unions, and other actors deeply invested in the design of
legislative districts turn to the VRA because it is the only available legal tool
for challenging legislative districts.39 The absence of justiciable limits on
partisan gerrymandering means that political claims get recast as racial
claims. 40 Other research shows that a disproportionate number of election
lawsuits are brought in swing states.4 1 Cases that are not meritorious may well
settle-and thus get counted in McCrary's and Kousser's datasets-because
risk-averse elected officials defending the cases worry that opposite-party
judges will be biased against them.42
The final difficulty with the Katz, McCrary, and Kousser standards is their
retrospective nature. They capture accumulated histories, not current
conditions. To our minds this is reasonable, but it may not satisfy the Roberts
Court, which rejects the idea that states may be singled out for coverage based
on racial discrimination that took place "decades" ago.43
The remaining option is to base coverage on current societal conditions
that plainly correlate with the risk of unconstitutional race discrimination. This
approach permits relativistic distinctions to be drawn among the states, based
on geographic disparities in risk factors for constitutional violations, but it does
not permit absolute judgments about the severity of the problem of
unconstitutional race discrimination in the typical state (or any other state). In
an era when discriminators generally conceal their motives, such absolute
judgments are probably impossible.
So what societal conditions might anchor Section 5 coverage? Stephen
Ansolabehere, Nathaniel Persily, and Charles Stewart have pointed to racially
polarized voting.44 Morgan Kousser has proposed minority population size.45
38. See Adam B. Cox & Thomas J. Miles, Documenting Discrimination?,108 COLUM. L.
REV. SIDEBAR 31 (2008).
39. Samuel Issacharoff, Gerrymanderingand Political Cartels, 116 HARv. L. REv. 593, 630-

45 (2002).
40.

Id. at 630-31.

41.

Charles Anthony Smith & Christopher Shortell, The Suits That Counted: The

JudicializationofPresidentialElections, 6 ELECTION L.J. 251 (2007).
42. Cf GARY W. Cox & JONATHAN N. KATZ, ELBRIDGE GERRY'S SALAMANDER: THE
ELECTORAL CONSEQUENCES OF THE REAPPORTIONMENT REVOLUTION (2002) (exploring
redistricters' incentives, against the backdrop of litigation); Randall D. Lloyd, SeparatingPartisanship
from Party in Judicial Research: Reapportionmentin the U.S. DistrictCourts, 89 AM. POL. SC. REV.
413 (1995) (finding that district judges are more likely to uphold redistricting maps adopted by
legislatures controlled by their own parties).
43. Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, No. 12-96, slip op. at 20 (U.S. June 25, 2013).
44. Stephen Ansolabehere et al., Race, Region, and Vote Choice in the 2008 Election:
Implications for the Future of the Voting Rights Act, 123 HARV. L. REV. 1385 (2010); Stephen
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We support these approaches on policy grounds, but for legal reasons we think
it is also necessary to condition coverage on voter discrimination, or a good
proxy for voter discrimination.
A coverage formula based on the size of the minority population would, at
least arguably, have a "logical relation" to unconstitutional race discrimination
in the electoral process. If the minority population is very small, then schemes
to disenfranchise it are not worth the bother. Minority populations become
targets for electoral discrimination only when they are large enough to matter
politically. The problem with basing coverage on demographics alone is that
doing so would be insensitive to motives. Some demographic majorities in
some places are perfectly happy with large minority groups exercising political
power. We are aware of no pattern of actual or threatened disenfranchisement
of men by women, or of blondes by brunettes.
At first glance, one might think the motive problem with basing coverage
on the size of the minority population could be solved by further conditioning
coverage on the existence of severe racial polarization in political preferences.
When the racial majority and a racial minority have opposing partisan or policy
preferences, and when the minority is large enough to matter politically, the
majority has a powerful political incentive to jigger election rules so as to
burden and dilute minority voting.
As a matter of constitutional law, however, there is a plausible argument
that such politically motivated discrimination with respect to voting is not "race
discrimination" within the meaning of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth
Amendments. This may be so even if the state actor self-consciously targets
minority-race voters, so long as the state actor merely treats race as a proxy for
partisanship or ideology. Our point is well illustrated by the racial
gerrymandering cases. The Supreme Court requires plaintiffs challenging racial
gerrymanders to prove that "race was the predominantfactor motivating the
legislature's districting decision."A6 By contrast, under general equal protection
jurisprudence, a showing that race was only one factor behind the decision at
issue shifts the burden to defendants to prove that race was not a but-for cause
of the decision. 47

Ansolabehere et al., Regional Differences in Racial Polarizationin the 2012 PresidentialElection:
Implicationsfor the Constitutionalityof Section 5 ofthe Voting Rights Act, 126 HARv. L. REv. FORUM
205 (2013); cf Persily, supranote 17, at 240-43 (arguing that courts should interpret Section 5 to limit
its application in jurisdictions that are not characterized by severely polarized voting).
45. Morgan Kousser, Gutting the Landmark Civil Rights Legislation, REUTERS BLOG
(June 26, 2013), http://blogs.reuters.com/great-debate/2013/06/26/gutting-the-landmark-civil-rights
-legislation/.
46. Easley v. Cromartie, 532 U.S. 234, 241 (2001) (quoting Hunt v. Cromartie, 526 U.S. 541,
547 (1999)).
47. See Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 270 n.21 (1977).
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The "predominant factor" test requires plaintiffs who challenge a racial
gerrymander that serves political objectives-advancing the fortunes of a
political party, or protecting an incumbent-to produce an alternative map that
would serve the legislature's political objectives equally well while yielding
less racially homogenous districts.48 That redistricters categorized citizens by
race and purposefully shifted these race-categorized citizens among districts to
achieve their objectives generally does not give rise to a presumptive equal
protection violation, 49 unless the line-drawers pursued their political objectives
ineptly,50 or "subordinated [to racial considerations] traditional race-neutral
districting principles . . . ."s At root, as Justice Thomas pointed out in dissent

in Easley v. Cromartie, the racial gerrymandering cases shift the equal
protection inquiry from the question of whether the decision maker classified
persons because of their race, to the question of why race was considered
(partisan politics, or something more nefarious).52
This is a problem for any coverage formula that privileges racially
polarized voting and minority population size. At best, such a formula would
capture the incentive to discriminate against racial minorities because of their
political views. But if targeting a group because of its political views while
being "aware" 5 3 of its race does not transgress the Constitution's race
discrimination norms, then a polarization-based coverage formula would not
seem very well-connected to constitutional violations either. There is a solid
argument, nicely put by both Judge Alex Kozinski and Justice Thomas, that
political discrimination is unconstitutional race discrimination when the
discriminator targets a racial group, using race as a proxy for political beliefs.54
But because there are plausible doctrinal arguments against this position, we
remain wary of grounding coverage on political incentives alone.
The doctrinal infirmities of a polarization-based coverage formula would
not infect a formula based on what we call "voter discrimination." By voter
discrimination, we mean expressions of preference at the ballot box that would
violate the Constitution's race discrimination norms if voting were a state
action. Where large numbers of voters form preferences and make choices
using race in a fashion that the Constitution disallows to state actors-e.g.,
48. Easley, 532 U.S. at 258.
49. See, for example, Justice Thomas's discussion of such evidence in Easley, 532 U.S. at
266-67 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
50. Such that plaintiffs can produce an alternative map that better serves the redistricters'
political objectives.
51. Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 916 (1995).
52. Easley, 532 U.S. at 266 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (italics in original).
53. "Aware[ness]" and "consciousness" are euphemisms the Supreme Court has used in the
racial gerrymandering cases. See id. at 254 (quoting earlier cases).
54. Garza v. Cnty. of L.A., 918 F.2d 763, 778 n.1 (9th Cir. 1990) (Kozinski, J., dissenting)
(analogizing political discrimination against a racial group by incumbents who feared that they would
be dislodged, to an agreement by Anglo homeowners-who harbor no animus against the minority
group-not to sell to minority buyers in order to protect property values).
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acting on the basis of negative stereotypes about minorities-there is a
"logical, 5 5 basis for suspecting an elevated risk of unconstitutional state action.
Three independent grounds support this inference. First, as one of us has
recently argued, the electorate as a whole performs a "public function" within
the meaning of state action doctrine when it puts in office officials who will
exercise the coercive power of the state (even though the individual voter is not
a state actor).56 It follows that election outcomes are unconstitutional-though
probably not judicially remediable-when determined by racially
discriminatory votes.57 Nothing in the VRA prohibits or could prohibit voting
for racially discriminatory reasons,58 but the downstream effect of
unconstitutional election outcomes on minority representation can be mitigated
through the preclearance mechanism of Section 5.
Second, if voters discriminate in a constitutionally impermissible way
when choosing candidates, it is likely (or at least more likely than would
otherwise be the case) that the officials they elect will share their prejudices. 59
If the officials act on such predispositions-canceling early voting, for
example, because it is popular with African Americans 6-they are violating
the Constitution's guarantee of equal protection.
Third, lawmakers who don't share the voters' stereotypes will nonetheless
face electoral pressure to cater to their constituents' racial attitudes and
attendant policy preferences. It is settled law that state action undertaken in
response to private citizens' racially discriminatory preferences violates the
Fourteenth Amendment, even if the state actor does not share or approve of the
private preference. 6 1 Whites with dim views of blacks' work ethic, intelligence,
and trustworthiness, for example, are probably more supportive of laws that

55. Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, No. 12-96, slip op. at 21 (U.S. June 25, 2013).
56. This argument is developed in Elmendorf, Making Sense of Section 2, supra note 6, at
428-36.
57. Elmendorf, Making Sense ofSection 2, supra note 6, at 428-36.
58. The First Amendment likely protects an individual right to vote for racially discriminatory
reasons. See id.
59. This is likely because of both "pool effects" (the pool of eligible candidates is drawn from
voting-age residents of the jurisdiction), and "selection effects" (voters who discriminate presumably
prefer like-minded candidates). We recognize, though, that there is much work still to be done on
elected officials' propensities to discriminate. For a recent, promising effort in this regard, see David
Broockman & Daniel M. Butler, Do PoliticiansRacially DiscriminateAgainst Constituents?A Field
Experiment on State Legislators, 55 AM. J.POL. ScI. 463 (2011).
60. See Michael C. Herron & Daniel A. Smith, Early Voting in Florida in the Aftermath of
House Bill 1355 (Apr. 15, 2013) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://www.dartmouth.edu/
-herron/HerronSmithFloridaEarly2Ol2.pdf (using statewide data and natural experiments to show that
racial minorities were disproportionately burdened by Florida's cutbacks in early voting).
61. Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 433 (1984) (holding that "the reality of private biases and
the possible injury they might inflict are [not] permissible considerations for removal of an infant child
from the custody of its natural mother").
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dampen minority turnout or diminish minority voting power.62 Who wants a
government of the dumb, the lazy, and the dishonest?
Our claim that voter discrimination generates a heightened risk of
unconstitutional state action should not be controversial, even among
conservatives. Acceptance of our claim is implicit in Chief Justice Roberts's
questioning during oral argument in Shelby County ("Are citizens in the South
more racist than citizens in the North?"6 3), and also in a standard doctrinal
move by conservative lower court judges in cases under Section 2 of the VRA
(requiring plaintiffs to trace their injury to intentional race discrimination,
whether by conventional state actors or by the electorate). 64
The central task for linking preclearance to voter discrimination is not
answering the conceptual question of whether the electorate is a state actor, but
rather: (1) identifying forms of voter reliance on race that the Constitution
disallows to state actors, (2) measuring that reliance or a good, observable
proxy for it, and (3) estimating the prevalence of voter discrimination within
discrete geopolitical units, such as states.
The first task is not difficult. Animus and stereotyping are the overarching
concerns of equal protection law. Voters discriminate in the constitutional
sense if they act on the basis of their loathing of a racial minority, their belief
that the minority group is fundamentally inferior, or even (probably) their lesser
concern for the welfare of members of the minority group relative to members
of their own group. 6
Voters also discriminate if they stereotype candidates on the basis of race.
Equal protection cases often suggest that state actors may not make any
inferences about persons based on membership in a protected class, except
perhaps in rare instances where the inference serves a compelling state interest

62. See Parts II and III for data concerning such stereotypes.
63. Transcript of Oral Argument, Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013) (No. 12-96).
64. For summaries of where the circuits stand on this question, see Elmendorf. Making Sense
ofSection 2, supra note 6, at 407; Katz et al., supranote 34, at 670-72. We have scoured the cases and
found not a single instance in which a lower court judge questioned whether a showing of private
discrimination by voters should suffice to establish "causation" in a vote dilution case.
65. See generally Cary Franklin, The Anti-stereotyping Principle in Constitutional Sex
Discrimination Law, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1831 (2010); Susannah W. Pollvogt, Unconstitutional

Animus, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 887 (2012).
66. The last point-a lesser concern for minority groups as a violation of equal protectionmay seem a stretch. But clearly the Equal Protection Clause would be violated if, say, a disability
benefits adjudicator, in the exercise of his discretion, were to award lesser benefits to black than to
similarly situated white applicants, reflecting his relative lack of care for the well-being of African
Americans. So too, a lawmaker would violate equal protection if she voted to fund road paving in
white communities but not in minority communities because she personally cared less about the wellbeing of persons of the minority race. These are biases within the meaning of equal protection law, and
if the biases are held privately (rather than by the lawmaker or adjudicator herself), they may not be
catered to and given legal effect by state actors per Palmorev. Sidoti,466 U.S. 429 (1984).
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67

and is statistically warranted. The law is particularly concerned with negative
stereotypes that may operate to lock members of a historically disadvantaged
group into inferior jobs, neighborhoods, or social positions. Not all
stereotypes are normatively objectionable, however. As we noted above, the
racial gerrymandering cases carve out some room for state actors to infer
partisanship or ideology from the race of voters.69 We see little basis for
impugning reliance on race as a voting cue if voters are just making statistically
accurate inferences about the candidates' party affiliations or policy
preferences.
By contrast, voter stereotyping clearly transgresses equal protection norms
if the voter assumes, based on a minority candidate's race, that the candidate is
less competent, honest, or hard-working than his white opponent, or more
likely to get caught up in sex scandal, etc. We also think that voters would
violate equal protection norms if they overgeneralized and made actuarially
unwarranted inferences about partisanship, ideology, or policy preferences of
the candidate-for example, assuming that the typical African American
candidate is much more liberal than the typical African American candidate
actually is.7 0 Our results do not depend on the latter claim, however. We will
focus on evidence concerning negative racial stereotypes that are
unquestionably beyond the pale as bases for state action.

67. See, e.g., Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499 (2005) (applying strict scrutiny to
California's practice of initially segregating inmates by race during a 60-day evaluation period,
notwithstanding undisputed record evidence concerning violent prison gangs organized on racial
lines); J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 139 n.11 (1994) ("Even ifa measure of truth can
be found in some of the gender stereotypes . .. that fact alone cannot support discrimination on the
basis of gender in jury selection. We have made abundantly clear in past cases that gender
classifications that rest on impermissible stereotypes violate the Equal Protection Clause, even when
some statistical support can be conjured up for the generalization.").
68. Jack M. Balkin, The Constitution ofStatus, 106 YALE L.J. 2313, 2353-54 (1997).
69. See supra notes 48-53 and accompanying text; cf Adam B. Cox & Richard T. Holden,
ReconsideringRacialand PartisanGerrymandering,78 U. Cm. L. REv. 533 (2011) (arguing that race
is a useful proxy for whether a voter registered as a Democrat reliably votes for the Democratic
candidate).
70. There is some evidence that voters confronted with information about minority candidates
that conforms to stigmatic stereotypes respond by perceiving the candidate to be much more liberal
than she or he actually is. See, e.g., Adam J. Berinsky et al., Sex and Race: Are Black CandidatesMore
Likely to be Disadvantagedby Sex Scandals?, 33 POL. BEHAV. 179 (2011); Adam J.Berinsky & Tali
Mendelberg, The Indirect Effects ofDiscreditedStereotypes in Judgments ofJewish Leaders, 49 AM.
J. POL. SC. 845 (2005). Observational data also show that Americans generally perceive African
American members of Congress to be more liberal than they actually are as implied by their roll call
votes. See Matthew L. Jacobsmeier, Racial Stereotypes and Perceptions of Representatives' Ideologies
in U.S. House Elections (Oct. 2013) (unpublished manuscript), availableat http://works.bepress.com/
matthew-jacobsmeier/l1/.
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II.
ESTIMATING THE GEOGRAPHY OF RACIAL DISCRIMINATION IN VOTING

This section introduces and defends our approach to ranking states and
political subdivisions by voter discrimination, which we proxy with a measure
of racial stereotyping.
We begin by explaining the methodological challenge of measuring voter
discrimination at the individual level. Under the conventions of modem social
science, it is nearly impossible to say whether a particular racial attitude or
belief (e.g., animus, unequal concern, stereotype) caused a particular political
behavior or preference (e.g., voting for Romney over Obama, opposing a path
to citizenship for illegal immigrants). Researchers can, however, establish
correlations between racial attitudes and political preferences. The law may
presume causation when these correlations coincide with widely shared
understandings about the expected effects of attitudes on behavior.
It follows that if Congress wishes to base a coverage formula on voter
discrimination, Congress may rely on geographic variation in the distribution of
negative racial stereotypes or animus within the majority-group electorate,
provided that the measure of racial attitudes is positively correlated with voters'
political preferences. Alternatively, Congress could rely on geographic
variation in voters' disparate treatment of candidates who appear similar in all
respects but their race, at least if the disparate treatment is unlikely to have
resulted from voters making statistically accurate inferences about candidates'
ideology or partisanship from their race.
After setting forth this argument, we dig into two large datasets on racial
stereotyping and political preferences. We develop a measure of racial
stereotyping based on survey questions about the intelligence, work effort, and
trustworthiness of members of different racial groups, and we show that,
controlling for other factors, voters who stereotype minorities negatively are
less likely to vote for minority candidates. We then introduce parametric and
nonparametric techniques for generating state-level and substate estimates of
the prevalence of racial stereotyping. Finally, we discuss the art of creating
one-dimensional summaries of the distribution of racial attitudes within a
geographic unit, summaries which are needed to compare and rank units for
VRA coverage. We show that nonlinearities in the relationship between racial
stereotyping and political preferences usefully inform the choice among
summary measures.
A. Measuring Voter Discrimination
1. The Conceptual Challenge

Questions about voter discrimination are, fundamentally, questions about
causation. In light of the constitutional doctrine canvassed in Part I, the causal
inquiry must proceed on two levels. First, does the race or apparent race of
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minority candidates cause majority-group voters to give less support to
minorities than to otherwise similar white candidates? (Analogous questions
may be asked about voter support for policies sponsored by or beneficial to
minorities.) Second, does the racial "treatment effect," if any, result from voters
acting on motives that the Constitution proscribes for state actors, or is it
instead due to voters' actuarially warranted use of race as a signal of ideology
or partisanship?
The first question can in principle be answered with experimental or even
observational data, but there are some complications. Political scientists and
psychologists have in recent years conducted numerous controlled experiments
in which voting-age adults are asked to state their preferences between
candidates or policies, and racial primes are experimentally manipulated.
Voters in the control group may see a white candidate; voters in the treatment
group see exactly the same candidate, except he is presented as African
American or Latino.
This method can reveal disparate treatment on the basis of race, but it is
quite a challenge to create state-level or substate estimates of racial
discrimination using experiments. The central difficulty is that standard
experimental protocols, with random assignment of subjects to treatment and
control conditions, only support causal inferences about the average treatment
effect across a group of subjects. 7 2 To obtain state-specific estimates of
treatment effects, one must either run the experiment on large numbers of
subjects in each state (which is costly), or else develop a model that permits
information about treatment effects on subjects in state x to be used to estimate
treatment effects on subjects in state y.
The other large difficulty is that experimental treatments designed to
prime racial considerations may end up priming other things too, making it
hard to know whether the treatment effect is really a racial effect. For example,
an experiment that presents respondents with an image of Obama (treatment) or
a prominent white Democrat (control) may induce a response that has more to
do with respondents' evaluations of Obama's performance than their sense of
his race. A third limitation of most existing studies is that researchers generally
randomize few attributes of the scenario presented to respondents except the

71.

For a recent review, see Darren Davis, Racial Identity and ExperimentalMethodology, in

CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK OF EXPERIMENTAL POLMCAL SCIENCE 559 (James N. Druckman et al. eds.,

2011).
72. Paul W. Holland, Statistics and CausalInference, 81 J.AM. STAT. ASS'N 945 (1986).
73. One of us is presently working on such a model-building exercise, and the results may in
time help to refine the non-experimental estimates of the geography of discrimination in voting
presented in this Article. See also Justin Grimmer et al., Estimating Heterogeneous Treatment Effects
and the Effects of Heterogeneous Treatments with Ensemble Methods (Mar. 30, 2014) (unpublished
manuscript), available at http://www.stanford.edu/jgrimmer/het.pdf (exploring model-based
approaches to the estimation of treatment effects on subgroups of subjects).

2014]

GEOGRAPHY OF RACIAL STEREOTYPING

1141

racial prime, which makes it impossible to say whether the racial treatment
effect is conditional on some idiosyncratic feature of the experimental
scenario. 74
Disparate treatment can also be studied non-experimentally by comparing
support for actual minority candidates with support for putatively similar white
candidates. Simon Jackman and Lynn Vavrek have pursued this idea,75 as have
Stephen Ansolabehere, Nathaniel Persily, and Charles Stewart,76 But to create
state-specific estimates of voter discrimination, voters everywhere must be
comparing the same candidates. Since no minority politician other than Barack
Obama has been a serious contender in recent national elections, these studies
have been limited to comparing support for Obama with support for other
candidates.n This makes it impossible to disentangle race effects from other
traits that differentiate Obama from other leading Democrats.
Assuming that one has accumulated evidence of disparate treatment, the
next question-from a legal perspective-is whether the disparate treatment
was caused by stereotyping, animus, or some other constitutionally disfavored
motive. 78 It is exceedingly difficult to answer this definitively.7 9 Social
scientists learn about causation by randomly assigning experimental treatments
to some subjects and a placebo to others, or by looking for real-world events
("natural experiments") that are akin to controlled experiments.80 But racial
beliefs cannot be randomly assigned to research subjects, and events in the
world that might induce the development of a racial attitude in particular
subjects probably induce many other changes as well, many of which go
74.

For a recent and promising effort to solve this problem, see Jens Hainmueller et al., Causal

Inference in Conjoint Analysis: Understanding Multidimensional Choices via Stated Preference
Experiments, 22 POL. ANALYSIS 1(2014).

75. Simon Jackman & Lynn Vavrek, How Does Obama Match-Up? Counterfactuals & The
Role of Obama's Race in 2008 (Aug. 31, 2011) (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://jackman.stanford.edu/papers/index.php (modeling likely vote share of different actual or
potential Democratic candidates-including Obama-against McCain).
76. Stephen Ansolabehere et al., Race, Region, and Vote Choice in the 2008 Election:
Implications for the Future of the Voting Rights Act, 123 HARv. L. REv. 1385, 1424-35 (2010)

(comparing different structure of support for Obama in 2008 and support for Kerry in 2004, and
contrasting support for Obama versus other Democratic candidates in the primary election).
77. This kind of analysis requires a national survey about candidate preferences in which at
least one of the candidates is a racial minority. Obama is the only minority candidate to have been
nominated for President.
78. There is a plausible case that disparate treatment regardless of motive is unconstitutional
unless necessary to serve a compelling state interest, but as noted above this position is in tension with
Supreme Court cases that seem to allow some disparate treatment for "political" reasons. See supra
notes 46-54 and accompanying text.
79. For an accessible introduction to the problem from leading political scientists, see Donald
P. Green et al., Enough Already About "Black Box" Experiments: Studying Mediation is More
Dificult Than Most Scholars Suppose, 628 ANNALS OF THE AM. ACAD. OF POL. & Soc. SCI. 200

(2010).
80. See generally JOSHUA D. ANGRIST & JORN-STEFFEN PISCHKE, MOSTLY HARMLESS
ECONOMETRICS: AN EMPIRICIST'S COMPANION (2009); D. James Greiner, Causal Inference in Civil
Rights Litigation, 122 HARV. L. REV. 553 (2008).
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unmeasured or even unrecognized by the analyst. 8 It is easy to test for
correlations between racial attitudes and political behavior, but nearly
impossible to determine whether the attitude caused the behavior.
This point would be devastating to the project of grounding Section 5
coverage on voter discrimination if the law's standards for causal inference
tracked those of preeminent social science and statistics journals. But law is a
practical endeavor. Just as adjudicative fact-finders bring their background
understandings of human motivation and behavior to bear when they decide
whether a witness is telling the truth, or whether a defendant acted with
criminal intent, so too may Congress rely on conventional understandings about
the effects of racial attitudes on behavior when interpreting correlational
evidence. Racial stereotyping would not be condemned if it were not thought to
affect behavior.
To put the point simply: Congress will have made a reasonable, good faith
effort to tie Section 5's coverage to evidence of voter discrimination if
Congress relies on studies that (1) show geographic variation in disparate
treatment of minority candidates by white voters, and (2) establish that the
negative effect of minority candidates' race on majority-voter support is larger
among voters who disparagingly or inaccurately stereotype the racial minority,
express animus toward the minority, or otherwise demonstrate less concern
about the welfare of minority citizens. The law can demand no more.
It would also be reasonable for Congress to begin with evidence
concerning geographic variation in citizens' racial attitudes, and then look to
see whether the attitude correlates with political preferences. If the attitude or
belief is one that state actors may not rely upon, and if it correlates with
political behavior or preferences in ways that are "likely" to be causal-given
background societal understandings about the effects of racial attitudes on
behavior-then Congress could treat the attitude as a plausible proxy for
discriminatory voting. Congress could then base Section 5 coverage on the
regional variation in the proportion of citizens who subscribe to the attitude, as
opposed to geographic variation in the effect of candidate race on vote choice.
This is the approach we will pursue in the balance of this Article.
We have adopted this approach not because we think it is conceptually
superior to working with evidence of candidate "race effects" on voter support,
as documented through survey, field, or natural experiments, but because it is
practicable. In the last few years, huge national surveys have been conducted
that ask voting-age Americans about their racial attitudes. The surveys also ask
about political preferences. As we explain below, these data make it possible to

81. Cf Green et al., supra note 79, at 204 ("[I]t is seldom easy to design an experiment that
manipulates only M [the hypothesized mediator of an experimental treatment] and not some other M'
that might also mediate the effect ofX").
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estimate the geography of racial attitudes at a pretty fine scale, and to establish
the requisite correlations between racial stereotypes and political preferences.
2. Choosing the Measure ofRacial Attitudes

Political psychologists have devoted enormous energy over the last
several decades to the measurement of racial prejudice. There is no disciplinary
consensus about the best measure. Some researchers rely on survey questions
designed to tap what is now known as "old-fashioned racism." 82 Hallmarks
include opposing intermarriage, and believing that interracial socioeconomic
disparities are due to underlying genetic differences. 83 Researchers have also
sought to measure stereotyping, asking respondents whether they think persons
of a given group are hardworking or lazy, trustworthy or untrustworthy, and
intelligent or unintelligent.84
Other researchers prefer metrics of what they call "racial resentment" or
"symbolic racism."8 5 These scales are constructed from questions about
whether the respondent perceives racial discrimination to be pervasive and
severe; whether she believes that blacks would close the socioeconomic gap if
only they worked harder; whether she thinks that blacks have gotten less than
they deserve, and, conversely, whether she agrees that blacks have been too
demanding in their push for civil rights.86
Still others scholars defend (or attack) new-fangled measures of "implicit
bias," derived from subtle tests of the reaction times of subjects who have been
presented with racial primes so fleeting that they never enter the respondent's
consciousness.87

82.

HOWARD

SCHUMAN

ET AL.,

RACIAL

ATTITUDES

IN AMERICA:

TRENDS

AND

INTERPRETATIONS (rev. ed. 1997).
83. The preeminent exponents of continued (and refined) use of old-fashioned racism
measures today are Stanley Feldman and Leonie Huddy. See, e.g., Leonie Huddy & Stanley Feldman,
On Assessing the PoliticalEffects ofRacialPrejudice,12 ANN. REV. POL. SC. 423 (2009) [hereinafter
Huddy & Feldman, Assessing Racial Prejudice]; Stanley Feldman & Leonie Huddy, The Structure of
White Racial Attitudes (APSA 2010 Annual Meeting Paper), available at http://papers.ssm.com/
sol3/papers.cfin?abstractid=1643879.
84. For a review of the racial stereotyping literature, with attention to political effects, see
Huddy & Feldman,Assessing Racial Prejudice,supra note 83, at 429-30.
85. DONALD R. KINDER & LYNN M. SANDERS, DIVIDED By COLOR: RACIAL POLITICS AND
DEMOCRATIC IDEALS (1996); Donald R. Kinder & David 0. Sears, Prejudiceand Politics: Symbolic
Racism Versus Racial Threats to the Good Life, 40 J. OF PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 414 (1981);
Christopher Tarman & David 0. Sears, The Conceptualizationand Measurement ofSymbolic Racism,
67 J. POL. 731 (2005). For reviews of the literature, see David 0. Sears & P.J. Henry, Over Thirty
Years Later: A Contemporary Look at Symbolic Racism, in ADVANCES IN EXPERIMENTAL SOCIAL
PSYCHOLOGY 95 (Mark P. Zanna ed., 2005); Huddy & Feldman, Assessing Racial Prejudice, supra
note 83, at 429-30.
86. For the exact question wording, see Christopher Tarman & David 0. Sears, The
Conceptualization and MeasurementofSymbolic Racism, 67 J. POL. 731, 738 (2005).
87. See generally Russell H. Fazio & Michael A. Olson, Implicit Measures in Social Cognition
Research: TheirMeaning and Use, 54 ANN. REV. PSYCHOL. 297 (2003).
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For VRA purposes, the choice among these measures is straightforward.
Racial stereotyping and old-fashioned racism are adequate to the task,
assuming that the necessary correlation with political preferences can be
established. But neither racial resentment nor implicit bias presently suffice.
The fatal weakness of racial resentment is that state action is not rendered
unconstitutional if motivated by the belief that racism is no longer pervasive,
that blacks have not gotten less than they deserve, or that blacks have been too
demanding in their push for civil rights. Whether or not racial resentment
correlates with racism,88 the particular beliefs that the racial resentment
questions tap are not impermissible bases for state action.
Implicit bias presents a more difficult case. If reaction-time tests capture
differential sympathy or concern for members of different racial groups, then
perhaps they could serve as the attitudinal predicate for a voter-discrimination
coverage formula-if the implicit bias measure can be connected to political
preferences. One study found that anti-black implicit bias was correlated with
voter abstention in the 2008 presidential race.89 But data from the gold-standard
survey of Americans' political beliefs show essentially no relationship between
implicit racial bias and numerous measures of political preferences. 90 It would
be premature, at the very least, to base Section 5 coverage on implicit racial
bias.
3. Our Measure, Explicit Stereotyping-Validated

The geography of discrimination results reported in this Article are based
on explicit stereotyping questions that were included in the online module of
the 2008 National Annenberg Election Survey (NAES), 91 and an online survey
administered in the same year by the Cooperative Campaign Analysis Project
92
(CCAP). We use these data because the sample sizes are very large, and
because the questions get at motives that the Constitution proscribes for state
actors.93

88. For an introduction to this debate, see Huddy & Feldman, Assessing Racial Prejudice,
supra note 83.
89. B. Keith Payne et al., Implicit and Explicit Prejudice in the 2008 American Presidential
Election, 46 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 367, 370 (2010).

90. Donald R. Kinder & Timothy J. Ryan, Prejudice and Politics Re-Examined: The Political
Significance of Implicit Racial Bias 19 (APSA 2012 Annual Meeting Paper), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfnabstract-id=2105240 (explaining that "the weak correlation
between implicit and explicit prejudice means that the effect of implicit prejudice mediated by explicit
prejudice-the indirect effect of implicit prejudice-is necessarily tiny").
91. NAES 08 National Annenberg Election Survey, TIHE ANNENBERG PUBLIC POLICY
CENTER, https://services.annenbergpublicpolicycenter.org/naes08/online (last visited June 18, 2014).
92. SIMON JACKMAN & LYNN VAVRECK, COOPERATIVE CAMPAIGN ANALYSIS PROJECT:
EDWARDs'

SUPPORT BREAKS FOR OBAMA

(2008),

available at http://jackman.stanford.edu/

CCAP2008/ccapEDWARDS.pdf
93. There is no similar large-N survey with questions about old-fashioned racism.
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The 2008 NAES online panel comprised "a nationally representative
random sample of 28,985 respondents."94 Participants were interviewed in
several waves before and after primaries and the general election, with
questions in each wave tailored to contemporaneous events. Similarly, the optin 2008 CCAP online survey was a nationally representative multi-wave panel
study. We rely on the 20,000 responses to the CCAP "common content"
questions.96
NAES respondents were asked to rate the work ethic, trustworthiness, and
intelligence of members of their own ethnic group "in general" using a slider.97
The scales ranged from "extremely hardworking" to "extremely lazy,"
"extremely intelligent" to "extremely unintelligent," and "extremely
trustworthy" to "extremely untrustworthy." Responses were coded using a 100point scale. Subsequently, the survey asked participants to rate blacks "in
general" for the same traits in the same way. These questions have been asked
for a number of years on the General Social Survey and the American National
Election Survey, and have been studied extensively. They have "long been
considered a valid measure of racial prejudice," even by vehement critics of the
racial resentment scales.99
The CCAP posed similar questions about the intelligence and work effort
of "Whites," "African Americans," "Hispanic Americans," and "Asian
Americans."oo The CCAP asked respondents to rate members of these groups
on a 7-point scale ("where '1' means you think almost all of the people in that
group are 'lazy'; and 7 means you think almost everyone in the group is
94.

See NAES 08 National Annenberg Election Survey, THE ANNENBERG PUBLIC POLICY

CENTER, https://services.annenbergpublicpolicycenter.org/naes08/online (last visited June 18, 2014).
95. The CCAP was administered in six waves between December 2007 and November 2008.
The NAES was administered in five waves between October 2007 and January 2009. We apply survey
weights provided by the Principal Investigators of the CCAP to adjust for the selection bias of an
opt-in survey. On the representativeness of such opt-in samples, see Stephen Ansolabehere & Brian F.
Shaffer, Does Survey Mode Still Matter? Findingsfrom a 2010 Multi-Mode Comparison, 22 POL.
ANALYSIS (forthcoming 2014), available at http://pan.oxfordjournals.org/content/early/2014/05/
28/pan.mptO25.short; Douglas Rivers & Delia Bailey, Inference From Matched Samples in the 2008
U.S. NationalElections,2009 PROCEEDINGS OF THE JOINT STATISTICAL MEETINGS 627 (2009).

96. Our analysis relies on the subset of survey respondents that answered all of the available
racial stereotyping questions. For a discussion of cooperative survey projects and the mechanics of
administering a "common content" see Lynn Vavreck & Douglas Rivers, The 2006 Cooperative
CongressionalElection Survey, 18 J. ELECTIONS, PUB. OPINION & PARTIES 355 (2008).
97. For exact question wording, see variables SBO1, SB02, SB03, SBO4, SB05, and SB06 in
the on-line catalogue for the 2008 National Annenberg Election Survey. NAES 08 NationalAnnenberg
Election

Survey:

Variable

Catalog,

THE

ANNENBERG

PUBLIC

POLICY

CENTER,

https://services.annenbergpublicpolicycenter.org/naes08/online/variables/index.html#subject-SB (last
visited June 18, 2014).
98. For a review, see Huddy & Feldman,supra note 83, at 429-30.
99.

Edward G. Carmines et al., On the Meaning, Measurement, and Implications ofRacial

Resentment, 634 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 98, 102 (2011).
100. SIMON JACKMAN & LYNN VAVRECK, COOPERATIVE CAMPAIGN ANALYSIS PROJECT:
RELEASE 2.1 (2010) (on file with author) [hereinafter "CCAP CODEBOOK"] (questions SCAP718 and

SCAP719).
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'hardworking'), and, unlike NAES, CCAP used a single question to elicit
ratings of several different racial groups. However, as Figure I shows, the
empirical distribution of normalized racial attitudes per the CCAP survey is
quite similar to the distribution found by NAES.' 0 In light of Figure I and for
succinctness in reporting results, we pooled the CCAP and NAES data.102
(Results using un-pooled data are reported in Appendix A online.o10 3

o

NAES (N=19,325)
ao

-

_--

CCAP (N=17,825)

Z.

C4
o

-6

-4

-2

0

2

4

6

Bandwidth = 0.25

Figure 1. Estimated density of anti-black stereotypes among non-black
respondents to the 2008 National Annenberg Election Surveyl0 (N=19,325)
and the 2008 Cooperative Campaign Analysis Project'0 5 (N=17,825) surveys.
For ease of comparison, the measures have been normalized so that the mean
value is 0 and the standard deviation is 1 for each distribution. The vertical line
represents the median value of the pooled distribution, which is less than zero
due to the positive skew of responses in both datasets. Larger (i.e. positive)
numbers represent more negative stereotyping.
Responses to questions about racial stereotypes may be distorted to some
extent by social desirability biases (a reluctance to acknowledge one's
101. See Huddy & Feldman, supra note 83, at 429 ("Survey respondents often complain about
the blatant nature of racial stereotype items, and a sizeable number simply rate blacks at the scale
midpoint to avoid any appearance of racial bias.").
102. We applied survey weights to both datasets before pooling.
103. See Douglas M. Spencer, The Geography of Voter Discrimination, DOUGLAS M.
SPENCER, http://www.dougspencer.org/research/geography-ofidiscriniination.html (last visited June
17, 2014). Unpooled results are very similar to the results presented below.
104. See supra note 91.
105.

See supra note 92.
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societally disfavored beliefs). The density of responses right at the medianwhich, as Figure 2 shows, corresponds to an equal rating of the minority group
and one's own group-is quite suggestive of social desirability bias. But this
problem should not be overstated. The surveys were conducted online, and online surveys are less susceptible to social desirability biases than phone and inperson surveys.1 0 6 The privacy afforded by an anonymous online survey is
analogous to the privacy of the voting booth, and it is plausible that some
"contamination" of survey answers by social desirability biases in this context
actually results in a better measure of politically relevant stereotyping than
would uncontaminated survey responses. People who try to conform to social
norms against race discrimination when answering anonymous online surveys
about their political preferences may feel a similar pressure when voting.
We aggregated the stereotyping questions into a single measure of
stereotyping ("overall stereotyping") for each respondent, as follows:
Si =

Ro

In this formula R is a stereotyping rating, i indexes the respondent,
j indexes group attributes (work effort, intelligence, or trustworthiness; higher
scores mean lazy, unintelligent, or untrustworthy), and 0 and M refer,
respectively, to the respondent's own racial group and to the minority group in
question (blacks, Latinos, or Asian Americans). S is positive if, on average, the
respondent views her own racial group as better than the minority group on
these criteria; it is negative if the respondent deems the minority better than her
group.
By aggregating across several attributes, we reduce the impact of
measurement error on our prejudice variable.' 0 7 By using the difference
between the respondent's evaluation of his own group and his evaluation of the
target group, rather than the absolute value of the respondent's evaluation of
the target, we limit the impact of interpersonal differences in interpretation of
the rating scale. It would be misleading to characterize respondent A as more
prejudiced than respondent B solely on the basis of their respective placements
of blacks on the scale, if respondent A-who by assumption rated blacks worse
than did respondent B-gave similarly low marks to his own group as well. 0 8
106. Frauke Kreuter et al., Social Desirability Bias in CA TI, IVR, and Web Surveys: The
Effects ofMode and Question Sensitivity, 72 PUB. OPINION Q. 847, 858 (2008).

107.

On the importance of aggregation for overcoming measurement error in surveys of public

opinion, see Stephen Ansolabehere et al., The Strength of Issues: Using Multiple Measures to Gauge
Preference Stability, Ideological Constraint, and Issue Voting, 102 AM. POL. Sci. REv. 215, 218

(2008) (showing that citizen preferences measured with a single survey item appear very unstable, but
that almost any method of aggregating answers to several related survey questions reveals that citizens
have much more stable opinions than political scientists had long thought).
108. The survey did not include evaluations of racial groups other than the respondent's own
group and blacks. Therefore, this Article analyzes the difference between own-group and black
evaluations in our formula, rather than the difference between the respondent's evaluation of blacks
and her average evaluation of all non-black groups.
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Finally, we normalized the CCAP- and NAES-based prejudice measures, to
make them comparable to one another (see Figure 1).
The CCAP data enable a preliminary comparison of stereotypes about
Asian Americans, Latinos, and blacks. As Figure 2 shows (next page), the
modal reported stereotype for all three groups is zero (non-normalized data),
which may reflect social desirability biases. The distribution of stereotypes
around the mode varies with the group, however. For stereotypes of blacks and
Latinos, the distributions are quite similar, with many more whites expressing
adverse stereotypes (recall that favorable stereotypes of minorities correspond
to negative numbers on the stereotype scale). White stereotyping of Asian
Americans presents a totally different picture, with the number of whites
reporting favorable stereotypes greatly exceeding the number reporting bad
ones.
A measure of prejudice designed for VRA applications ought to satisfy
tests of predictive as well as face validity. We explained earlier that the
impossibility of randomizing racial attitudes and beliefs means that one cannot
make definitive causal claims about the effects of racial stereotypes on political
behavior. But if there is not even a correlation between racial stereotyping and
lack of support for minority candidates or opposition to minority-preferred
policies, it would seem most unlikely that majority-group stereotyping of the
minority deprives the minority community of an "equal opportunity to
participate in the political process and elect candidates of its choice.",to9

109.

See 42 U.S.C. 1973(b) (2006).
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Figure 2. Whites' stereotypes of minorities. The histogram represents the
difference between whites' stereotypes of their own race and stereotypes of
Asian Americans, blacks, and Latinos. The scale runs from negative fourteen to
fourteen and captures the sum of respondents' placement of each race on a
seven-point scale for perceived intelligence and work ethic. Data: White
respondents to the 2008 CCAP 1 o (N

13,000).

One can imagine a world in which many white citizens believe (1) that
blacks in general are less trustworthy, less intelligent, and less hardworking
than whites, but also (2) that basic fairness demands that each black candidate
be evaluated purely on his or her own merits, without regard to negative
qualities that the white citizen thinks are generally characteristic of the black
population. If white citizens actually adhere to this fairness norm, their negative
stereotypes of blacks might prove inconsequential politically.i 1
The large body of literature on prejudice and political behavior suggests,
however, that whites who derogate blacks as a group form candidate, policy,
and partisan preferences that reflect their racial beliefs.1 12 The balance of this
section confirms these findings for the case of anti-black stereotyping.
110. See supra note 92.
111. However, it is hard to even imagine a world in which such negative views of blacks do
not shape white preferences with respect to public policies that particularly concern the black
community.
112.

See, e.g., Huddy & Feldman, Assessing Racial Prejudice,supra note 83, at 429-30

(summarizing results of several other studies); Mark Peffley & Jon Hurwitz, The Racial Components
of "Race-Neutral" Crime Policy Attitudes, 23 POL. PSYCHOL. 59 (2002) (showing that whites who

stereotype blacks as lazy and violent support much harsher criminal policies, and that these whites'
negative evaluations of particular black prisoners-but not otherwise identical white prisoners-are
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Consider first the relationship between anti-black stereotyping and vote
choice in the 2008 general election, reported in Table 1 (p. 1152). The
coefficients represent the effect on the outcome variable (e.g., probability of
voting for Obama) when the independent variable shifts from its mean value to
one standard deviation above the mean, assuming a linear relationship. Model
(A) shows that our measure of anti-black stereotyping is strongly and
negatively related to voting for Obama, controlling for partisanship, ideology,
region, and other factors that correlate with political preferences." 3 A voter
who is one standard deviation more prejudiced than the national average is,
other things equal, about three percentage points less likely to support Obama
than an otherwise-similar voter with the mean level of anti-black prejudice.
These results almost certainly understate the effect of anti-black stereotyping
on support for Obama, since we control for partisanship and ideology, which to
some extent are intermediate outcomes of racial attitudes.1 4 There is
considerable evidence that racial attitudes drove late twentieth-century shifts in
party identification,115 and that Obama's ascension as the Democratic Party's

translated into greater support for punitive criminal laws); Mark Peffley et al., Racial Stereotypes and
Whites' Political Views of Blacks in the Context of Welfare and Crime, 41 AM. J. POL. Sci. 30 (1997)
(finding, with survey experiments, that whites who negatively stereotype blacks judge individual
blacks more harshly in scenarios involving welfare and crime); Jackman & Vavrek, supra note 75
(modeling thirty-three head-to-head actual and hypothetical matchups of presidential candidates, and
showing that negative stereotyping of blacks has a singularly large correlation with preferences in
head-to-heads involving Obama); Michael Tesler, The Return of Old Fashioned Racism to White
Americans' Partisan Preferences in the Early Obama Era (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://mst.michaeltesler.com/uploads/jop-r-full.pdf (showing that old-fashioned racism has shaped
party identification and voting in the Obama Era).
113. In models not presented (available upon request), we find that each of the three racial
stereotypes, considered individually, is also strongly and negatively related to voting for Obama. No
single stereotype does all the work. This is true for all models presented in the Article. See also
Spencer Piston, How Explicit Racial PrejudiceHurt Obama in the 2008 Election, 32 POL. BEHAV. 431
(2010) (finding similar results with same prejudice questions, but using ANES rather than NAES

data).
114. In our dataset, Republicans were more prejudiced than Democrats overall and anti-black
prejudice increases linearly with conservativeness. On average, the average Republican stereotype was
3% more negative than the national average whereas the average Democratic stereotype was 3%more
positive than the national average. In relative terms, where positive scores mean worse than the
national average and negative scores mean better than the national average, the (normalized) score
among Republicans is 0.14 and among Democrats is -0.17. Broken down by ideology, the relative,
normalized prejudice scores are:
Extremely
Slightly
Slightly
Extremely
Conservative
conservative
conservative
Moderate
Liberal
liberal
liberal
0.236
0.118
0.089
0.059
-0.234
-0.246
-0.394
115. See Nicholas A. Valentino & David 0. Sears, Old Times There Are Not Forgotten: Race
and PartisanRealignment in the ContemporarySouth, 49 AM. J.POL. SCi. 672 (2005).
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standard-bearer led prejudiced whites to become more Republican in their party
identification.116
Support for Obama among Democratic primary voters in 2008 is also
strongly correlated with racial stereotyping, as shown in Model (B). Again,
Obama did worse among non-blacks who negatively stereotype blacks,
controlling for ideology, income, region, and other factors." 7
The NAES survey asked some respondents whom they had supported in
the 2004 general election. We created a dummy variable that captures vote
switching between 2004 and 2008."9 The dependent variable in Model (C) in
Table 1 is coded as "1" if the respondent voted for Kerry in 2004 but not for
Obama in 2008. There is a positive, statistically significant association between
anti-black stereotyping and defection. That is, among 2004 Kerry voters, the
highly prejudiced were the most likely to defect to the Republican candidate in
2008. Because Obama induced Republican identification among prejudiced
voters,12 0 and because we control for partisanship, our results probably
understate the effect of anti-black stereotyping on Kerry-voter defections.

116. See Michael Tesler, The Return of Old Fashioned Racism to White Americans' Partisan
Preferences in the Early Obama Era (unpublished manuscript), available at http://mst.rnichael
tesler.com/uploads/jop-rr-full.pdf.
117. In the primary, though, the measure of party identification no longer explains non-support
for Obama, and women were less likely than men to support Obama in the primary.
118. See NAES 08 NationalAnnenberg Election Survey, THE ANNENBERG PUBLIC POLICY
CENTER, https://services.annenbergpublicpolicycenter.org/naes08/online (last visited June 18, 2014).
119. A "dummy variable" is a variable that can have only two values.
120. See Tesler, supranote 116.
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Negative stereotype

Age
Conservativeness
Party ID (7 point)
Female
R is Hispanic
R is "other" race
Education
Income
Midwest
South

West
(Intercept)

N
R2
adj. R 2

[Vol. 102:1123

(A)

(B)

(Obama)

(Obama)

(Kerry/)

('08 gen.)

('08 prim.)

(McCain)

-0.03***

-0.06***

(0.00)
-0.01***
(0.00)
-0.07***
(0.00)
-0.13***
(0.00)
-0.00
(0.00)
0.04***
(0.01)
0.12***
(0.03)
0.01***
(0.00)
0.00
(0.00)
0.00
(0.01)
-0.03***
(0.01)
-0.01
(0.01)
1.06***
(0.01)

(0.01)
-0.04***
(0.01)
-0.02***
(0.00)
0.00
(0.00)
-0.04***
(0.01)
-0.01
(0.02)
0.15*
(0.06)
0.05***
(0.01)
0.01*
(0.01)
0.04**
(0.01)
-0.05***
(0.01)
0.08***
(0.01)
0.56***
(0.03)

21033
0.66
0.66

10163
0.06
0.06

(C)

0.06***
(0.00)
0.00
(0.00)
0.03***
(0.00)
0.06***
(0.00)
0.01**
(0.00)
-0.03**
(0.01)
-0.09*
(0.04)
-0.01***
(0.00)
-0.00
(0.00)
-0.01
(0.01)
0.02*
(0.01)
-0.01
(0.01)
-0.03*
(0.02)
7619
0.21
0.21

Standard errors in parentheses
f significant at p < .10; *p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001

Table 1. Linear probability models predicting votes for or against Obama.
All non-dichotomous independent variables (prejudice, age, education, and
income) have been normalized to facilitate interpretation. Model (A) predicts
the probability of voting for Obama in the 2008 general election. Model (B)
predicts the probability of voting for Obama in the 2008 primary election and
only includes primary voters. Model (C) predicts the probability that a person
who voted for John Kerry in 2004 defected and did not vote for Obama in
2008. The model only includes people who voted for Kerry in 2004. Data: All
non-black respondents in the 2008 NAES
121.

Seesupranote9l.

21

and 2008 CCAP.1 22
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The models in Table 1 presuppose a linear relationship between racial
attitudes and political behavior. But the relationship could be more complex.
Voters who subscribe to positive stereotypes of racial minorities may be less
affected by these views than voters who express negative stereotypes. To dig
into this question, we reran the models in Table I after sorting respondents into
nine groups based on their stereotyping score. Each category of respondents
represents one-half of a standard deviation of the normalized distribution of
stereotyping scores. In the new model, we replace the stereotype variable with a
set of indicator variables for these respondent categories. The omitted category,
captured by the constant term in the model, consists of respondents within onequarter standard deviation of the median. Respondents in the "most negative
stereotype" and "most favorable stereotype" categories are at least 2.25
standard deviations away from the median. This setup provides a transparent
picture of how respondents at a given (approximate) distance from the median
racial attitude differ in their political preferences from respondents at the
median, because the model embeds no functional-form assumption about the
relationship between racial stereotyping and preferences over minority
candidates.
The results are striking. As Figure 3 shows, there is little if any correlation
between racial stereotypes and political preferences for respondents who are
less prejudiced than the median-that is, respondents who stereotype blacks
positively relative to their own group. The effects reported in Table 1 are
clearly driven by respondents who harbor negative stereotypes and, in
particular, those whose negative stereotypes are extreme. Respondents who
expressed the worst views of blacks (roughly 10% of all respondents) were
nearly 20% more likely than respondents at the median to vote for McCain in
2008 after voting for Kerry in 2004, 8% less likely to vote for Obama in the
general election, and 17% less likely to vote for Obama in the 2008 primary.
These models do not prove that anti-black stereotyping caused Obama to lose
votes-they show correlations only. But given the deep epistemic barriers to
making inferences about the causal effect of racial stereotypes on political
preferences, correlational evidence is for now the most that a practically
minded court or policy maker can reasonably hope for.

122.

See supra note 92.
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Figure 3. Probability of vote choice conditional on varying levels of racial
stereotyping (intervals of 0.5 standard deviation). Probabilities are estimated
using linear probability models that control for ideology, party identification,
age, sex, race, education, income, and region (see Table 1). Reported
probabilities are relative to the national median. Vertical bars represent 95%
confidence intervals and points represent values that are statistically
significantly different from zero. Data:2008 NAES"' and 2008 CCAP.' 24
What about anti-Latino and anti-Asian American stereotyping? We
obviously cannot establish the predictive validity of our prejudice measures
using support for Latino or Asian American candidates for president.125 But
CCAP did ask respondents whether they agreed more with the statement,
"Illegal immigrants should be arrested and deported," or "Illegal immigrants
now living in the U.S. should be allowed to become citizens if they pay a
fine." 26 In Figure 4, we plot the coefficients from a linear probability model
predicting agreement with the position that illegal immigrants should be
arrested and deported. The outcome variable is coded "1" if a respondent

123.
124.

See supra note 91.
See supra note 92.

125. In 2008, there were no Latino or Asian American candidates among the major party
nominees or among the front-runners for the major party nominations.
126. CCAP CODEBOOK, supranote 100 (question JCAP16).
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agrees that illegal immigrants should be arrested and deported and "0"
otherwise. We observe that respondents who are one standard deviation more
prejudiced against Latinos than the national average are also, other things
equal, about nine percentage points more likely to agree that illegal immigrants
should be arrested and deported instead of fined and granted citizenship. We
ran the same model after substituting anti-Asian American stereotyping for
anti-Latino stereotyping, and found only a small, statistically insignificant
correlation between Asian American stereotypes and immigration policy
preferences.
We remain reluctant to put much weight on the evidence concerning
Latino and Asian American stereotyping. The CCAP did not ask about
trustworthiness stereotypes with respect to these groups-and trustworthiness is
the stereotype we expect to be the most pervasive and harmful with respect to
immigrant populations.
Anti-Latino stereotype

-0-

Conservativeness

--

-0-

Party ID
--

R2 - 035

Female

Adjustod R2 -. 35

Education
Income

N = 7,780

---

-

Age.
Midwest

-

I

South
West
i

-0.1

0.0

0.1

0.2

i

0.3

Figure 4. Coefficients from a linear probability model predicting
agreement with the statement "illegal immigrants should be arrested and
deported." All non-dichotomous independent variables (stereotype, age,
education, and income) have been normalized to facilitate interpretation. Data:
All non-Latino respondents in the 2008 CCAP.

127.

Id.

127
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Also, we lack a candidate-election validation of the political relevance of
the Latino and Asian American stereotype measures, and the VRA today is
centrally concerned with barriers to the election of minority candidates. 12 8 We
note in passing, however, that the data on stereotyping of Asian Americans do
raise the question of whether Asian American should receive the same VRA
protections as blacks and Latinos. Per the CCAP, Asian Americans are
stereotyped more favorably than whites on balance, and it may well be the case
that Asian American candidates generally benefit from voters' stereotypes.1 29
B. From Individual Survey Responses to Jurisdiction-LevelRatings

After constructing an individual-level measure of prejudice, the next step
is to estimate overall levels of prejudice within discrete geopolitical units, such
as states, counties, or legislative districts. This presents two challenges:
estimating the views of voting-age citizens within each unit, and aggregating
those views into a summary measure for each jurisdiction.
1. Estimation: Disaggregationvs. MRP

Opinion within subnational political jurisdictions can be estimated by
disaggregation, or multilevel regression with poststratification (MRP).130
Disaggregation treats the sample of respondents within a geographic unit as
representative of the population of the unit. This is a fair assumption if every
member of the population within the unit had an equal probability of being
surveyed, and if the number of respondents within the unit is reasonably large.
The first condition is never exactly satisfied, because some people are more

128. Cf Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013) (criticizing Congress for using a
coverage formula based on voter registration and turnout, given that much of the evidence in the
congressional record concerned vote dilution).
129. Cf Cheryl Boudreau et al., Racial or Spatial Voting? The Effects of Ethnic Group
Endorsements in Low-Information Elections, Paper presented at the Conference of the Midwest
Political Science Association (April 2013) (finding that white voters in San Francisco elections
respond favorably to Chinese interest-group endorsements, and negatively to Latino interest-group
endorsements). Of course, it may be the case that Asian American candidates are disadvantaged by
racial stereotypes in some parts of the country, and/or that the CCAP stereotyping questions fail to
capture certain pernicious stereotypes about Asian Americans (e.g., disloyalty).
130. See, e.g., ANDREw GELMAN & JENNIFER HILL, DATA ANALYSIS USING REGRESSION
AND MULTILEVELJHIERARCHICAL MODELS (2007); Yair Ghitza & Andrew Gelman, Deep

Interactionswith MRP: Election Turnout and Voting PatternsAmong Small ElectoralSubgroups, 57
AM J. POL. SCI. 762 (2013); Jeffrey R. Lax & Justin H. Phillips, How Should We Estimate Public

Opinion in the States?, 53 AM. J. POL. SC. 107 (2009) [hereinafter Lax & Phillips, How Should We
Estimate Public Opinion?]; Jeffrey R. Lax & Justin H. Phillips, Gay Rights in the States: Public
Opinion and Policy Responsiveness, 103 AM. POL. Sci. REv. 367 (2009); Juliana Pacheco, Using

NationalSurveys to Measure Dynamic US. State Public Opinion: A Guidelinefor Scholars and an
Application, 11 ST. POL. & POL'Y Q. 415 (2011); David K. Park et al., Bayesian Multilevel Estimation

with Poststratification:State-Level Estimatesfrom NationalPolls, 12 POL. ANALYSIS 375 (2004).
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likely than others to accept invitations to answer surveys.131 Public opinion
researchers can nonetheless achieve high levels of predictive validity by
weighting imperfectly representative samples, so that the demographics of the
survey sample (after weighting) resemble Census Bureau estimates of the
demographics of the target population.1 32
The bigger problem for estimating opinion within small geographic units
is that typical national surveys contain only a small number of respondents
from any given subnational unit. When the number of respondents is small,
estimates of the average or typical opinion within a subnational unit remain
unbiased-insofar as every person in the unit had an equal probability of being
surveyed-but the estimates are very imprecise. The less precise the estimate,
the harder it is to say whether residents of one geographic unit are more
prejudiced than residents of another.
A recently popularized solution to this problem is to build and fit a
multilevel statistical model of public opinion. 33 Respondent opinion is
modeled as a function of individual-level demographics, such as age,
education, and race; geographic place of residence, such as the respondent's
state; and attributes of the geographic unit, such as region, religiosity, or
income inequality. The model yields an estimate of opinion for each
demographic type in each geographic unit. The average or median opinion
within each unit can then be calculated by weighting (poststratifying) the
opinion of each demographic type in the unit by the number of persons of that
type in the unit's population, using Census data.
This approach, called multilevel regression with poststratification (MRP),
has been shown to yield reliable estimates of public opinion on policy
questions, even if there are few respondents within many of the units. 34 MRP
has been used to estimate public opinion within states,135 congressional
districts,'3 state legislative districts,'3 cities,138 and even local school board
131. Further difficulties arise if the national survey was conducted with cluster sampling. See
Alissa Stollwerk, The Application of Multilevel Regression with Post-Stratification to Cluster Sampled
Polls: Challenges and Suggestions (May 22, 2013) (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://www.uiowa.edul-stpolsl3/papers/Stollwerk SPP-2013.pdf. Fortunately, neither the NAES nor
the CCAP used cluster sampling.
132. This is so even if the survey administrators do not purport to draw a random sample from
the target population. See Stephen Ansolabehere & Douglas Rivers, CooperativeSurvey Research, 16
ANN. REv. POL. SC. 307 (2013).
133. See supranote 130.
134. Leading validation studies include Lax & Phillips, How Should We Estimate Public
Opinion?, supra note 130; Christopher Warshaw & Jonathan Rodden, How Should We Measure
District-LevelPublicOpinion on IndividualIssues?, 74 J. POL. 203 (2012).
135. See, e.g., Ghitza & Gelman, supra note 130; Lax & Phillips, How Should We Estimate

Public Opinion?, supra note 130; Pacheco, supra note 130. For a user-oriented introduction to the
methods, see GELMAN & HILL, supra note 130.

136.
137.

See, e.g., Warshaw & Rodden, supra note 134.
See, e.g., Christopher Tausanovitch & Christopher Warshaw, Measuring Constituent

Policy Preferences in Congress, State Legislatures, and Cities, 75 J. POL. 330 (2013); Warshaw &
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districts.' 39 It has been validated by comparing MRP-generated estimates of
public opinion with election outcomes, in both candidate and ballot-initiative
elections.140
MRP and disaggregation each has benefits and costs. The strong suit of
disaggregation is its nonparametric, "model-free" character. It does not depend
in any way on the researcher's assumptions about the demographic or
aggregate-level correlates of public opinion. Researchers cannot manipulate the
results of their study by fitting different models and only reporting the model
whose results match the conclusion the researchers hoped to find. There are
also well-established, nonparametric techniques for quantifying the margin of
error associated with disaggregation-based estimates of mean or median
opinion in the target population. 141 For these reasons, we consider
disaggregation preferable to MRP for legal applications if the resulting
estimates have adequate statistical precision (margin of error) for the
contemplated application. 42
The downside of disaggregation is that it essentially throws away
information that is probative of public opinion within any given geographic
unit. Unlike disaggregation, MRP takes advantage of the fact that public
opinion varies in systematic ways with demography and geography. The
information in a national sample about the typical opinions of college-educated
Latinas, for example, sheds some light on the likely opinions of collegeeducated Latinas in, say, Boston. The likely opinion of any given person in
Boston is also illuminated by systematic differences, across demographic types,
between the opinions of respondents in Boston and the typical opinions of their
type in the national survey sample. Because MRP borrows information from
people outside the unit to estimate opinion within the unit, it yields more
precise estimates of in-unit opinion than disaggregation.
But this precision is deceptive if the underlying model isn't very good.
And fitting models is more art than science. Indeed, researchers have shown

Rodden, supra note 134; David E. Broockman & Christopher Skovron, What Politicians Believe
About Their Constituents: Asymmetric Misperception and Prospects for Constituency Control (Mar. 3,
2013) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://www.ocf.berkeley.edu/-broockina/broockman
_skovronasymmetric.misperceptions.pdf
138. See, e.g., Tausanovitch & Warshaw, supranote 137.
139.

See, e.g., MICHAEL BERKMAN & ERIC PLUTZER, EVOLUTION, CREATIONISM, AND THE

BATTLE TO CONTROL AMERICA'S CLASSROOMS (2010).

140.
141.

See supra notes 124-29 and accompanying text.
Both analytic or bootstrap-based methods may be used. See GEORGE CASELLA & ROGER

L. BERGER, STATISTICAL INFERENCE 417-515 (2d ed. 2002).

142. An important question about disaggregation (which we plan to pursue in future work) is
whether better estimates can be created by reweighting the disaggregated data so that it better matches
the demographics of the geographic sub-population of interest (e.g., residents of a state).
"Disaggregation plus reweighting" would represent something of an intermediate approach between
pure disaggregation and MRP.
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that more complex MRP models, with greater numbers of explanatory
variables, sometimes yield worse estimates of target-population opinion, even
though the complicated model does a better job of explaining opinion within
the pool of survey respondents. 14 3 This phenomenon, called overfitting, arises
because the estimated parameters in the more complex model capture
idiosyncratic features of the sample-features that are not representative of the
target population.
Our companion article on Section 2 and the geography of discrimination
discusses MRP in more detail, because our proposal for Section 2 requires
substate estimates of opinion.144 For Section 5, we think Congress can and
probably should tie coverage to disaggregation-based estimates of racial
stereotyping at the state level. This is more likely to win over a skeptical
judiciary than the model-based alternative, which might be seen as smoke and
mirrors. To address substate discrimination, Congress could permit an
administrative agency to remove cities and counties from coverage based on
local racial attitudes.' 45 This would shift discussions about MRP and modelfitting from Congress to the administrative forum for adjudicating bailout
petitions, and it would allay any residual judicial concern that Congress ginned
the model so as to create a politically convenient pattern of Section 5 coverage.
We return to this point in Part IV.
2. Summarizing Opinion Within Geographic Units

Disaggregation and MRP yield estimates of the distribution of opinion
within the geographic unit. But to rank or otherwise compare the units-a
predicate for basing Section 5 coverage on geographic disparities in voter
discrimination-one needs a one-dimensional summary measure of the
distribution. For example, one could create a ranking of the states by anti-black
stereotyping using the average stereotype of the state's non-black residents, the
median stereotype, the percentage of the state's non-black residents who harbor
worse stereotypes than the national average stereotype, or the percentage of the
state's non-black residents more than one standard deviation more prejudiced
than the average non-black person in the national sample. The possibilities can
be proliferated almost endlessly.
We don't have strong views about the best summary measure of racial
attitudes within a unit. From the point of view of a minority citizen or a
legislator concerned with minority interests, it's hard to know a priori whether
one would be better off with a white population that has a large fraction of
143. See, e.g., Jeffrey R. Lax & Justin H. Phillips, How Should We Estimate Sub-National
Opinion Using MRP? Preliminary Findings and Recommendations (Apr. 10, 2013) (unpublished
manuscript), available at http://www.columbia.edul-jrl2124/mrp2.pdf.
144. See Elmendorf& Spencer, supra note 7.
145. The agency might also extend coverage to certain political subdivisions within otherwise
non-covered states. See infra Part IV.
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moderate racists, or a smaller fraction of severe racists. The results in Figure 3
do suggest, however, that there is little if any relationship between racial
stereotyping and political preferences for citizens who subscribe to more
favorable views of African Americans than is typical nationally.
This implies that Section 5 coverage should not be based on the average
stereotype of a state's non-black residents, but rather on the proportion of
residents who are more prejudiced or substantially more prejudiced than the
national median. In Part III we compare these approaches and show that state
rankings by anti-black stereotyping are quite stable regardless of the metric
used to summarize state opinion. The choice among summary measures is
difficult in theory but not very important in practice.
III.
RESULTS

A. State Rankings by Anti-Black Stereotyping

Figure 5 (p. 1161) ranks the states by anti-black stereotyping among their
non-black populations. Results are calculated by disaggregation. In the panel on
the left, states are ranked by the proportion of the state's non-black residents
who regard blacks more negatively than does the median non-black American;
in the middle panel, by the proportion of non-black residents who are in the
upper quartile of the national non-black population by anti-black stereotyping;
and in the in the panel on the right, by the proportion of non-black residents
who are in the top 10% of the national non-black population by anti-black
stereotyping. The state rankings are quite similar across these three summary
measures of stereotyping.
The most striking pattern in Figure 5 is the clustering of historically covered
jurisdictions-states to which Section 5 applied prior to Shelby County-in the
upper register of the rankings. Of the nine fully covered states, seven are former
slave states: Alabama, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, South Carolina, Texas,
and Virginia. All seven except Virginia place in the top ten states by anti-black
stereotyping.146 The horizontal error bars show that the differences in racial
stereotyping between each of these states and the national "average" state reach
conventional levels of statistical significance except for Virginia and, by some
metrics, South Carolina. Two of the covered states, Alaska and Arizona, rank in
the lower half of the prejudice rankings. However, these states were covered
because of discrimination against Native Americans and Latinos, not blacks.147
146. It's worth noting in this regard that about 25% of Virginia's counties have escaped from
coverage through the "bail out" mechanisms of Section 4. See Section 4 of the Voting Rights Act,
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/vot/misc/sec-4.php#
bailout (last visited June 18, 2014).
147. See Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1975,40 Fed. Reg. 43,746, 49,422 (1975).
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Let us return to the Chief Justice's question: "Are citizens in the South more
racist than citizens in the North?" 48 If by "racist" Justice Roberts meant to
invoke "old-fashioned" beliefs about the genetic inferiority of African
Americans, then our data shed no light on his question. But if he simply meant
"adherence to a set of beliefs about racial differences that the Constitution
disallows as the basis for state action," then our answer is clear: non-black
residents of the covered states in the South-with the exception of Virginia, and
possibly South Carolina-are, in general, more racist than residents of other
states. 14 9 The fact that six of the seven Southern covered states rank in the topten by anti-black stereotyping means that the coverage formula invalidated by
Shelby County was plainly legitimate-at least according to the normative
standard for coverage implicit in the Chief Justice's questioning.
Today, however, this is water under the bridge. Shelby County assessed
the coverage formula on its face, rather than how it worked in practice. Our
results do not establish that Congress could reenact the invalidated formula and
have it approved by the Supreme Court. Rather, they show that Congress could
create a new, legally defensible coverage formula based on racial stereotyping
that would reach most of the states that Congress covered in 2006-and few if
any others.
B. County-Level Results

The old coverage formula attended to differences among political
subdivisions in the same state. If a particular county used a test or device as a
prerequisite to voting and had low rates of voter participation, but the parent
state did not, only the county was covered. 5 0 Many states therefore ended up
partially covered, with some political subdivisions subject to preclearance and
others exempt.' 51
A new coverage formula based on racial stereotyping could use either
states or political subdivisions of the states as the presumptive unit of
coverage.152 As we explain above, the advantage of making states the unit of
coverage is that reasonably precise state-level estimates of racial stereotyping
can be created by disaggregation.' 5 3 Substate estimates must be created with
148. Supra note 1.
149. The data do not allow us to meaningfully differentiate citizens from other residents at the
state level. Only eighteen respondents to the CCAP report being non-citizens (question SCAP764) and
the NAES does not ask about citizenship at all. Nevertheless, we would be very surprised if the
distribution of attitudes among citizens differed meaningfully from the distribution of attitudes among
the total population in many states.
150.

See JurisdictionsPreviously Covered by Section 5, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF

JUSTICE, http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/vot/sec_5/covered.php (last visited June 17, 2014).
15 1. Id
152. If states are the unit coverage, then substate jurisdictions would be subjected to
preclearance if and only if the parent state is covered.
153. See supra Part II.B.1.
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models, and rankings of substate geographic units will therefore depend to
some extent on modeling assumptions.
To provide a very rough sense of which counties might end up covered if
counties rather than states were the units of coverage, we created two versions
of what is called a "varying intercept, constant slope" MRP model.154 We
model racial stereotypes as a function of non-black respondents' demographic
attributes (simplified into three race, two sex, and four education categories)
and their county of residence. Our models presume that demographic attributes
correlate with racial attitudes in the same way in all counties, and that they
shape opinion independently of one another. This means, for example, that the
effects of education on anti-black stereotyping are assumed to be the same for
men and women, for Asian Americans and whites, and so forth.
The varying intercept allows estimated racial attitudes for all demographic
types in a county to be adjusted upward or downward, based on information in
the second level of the model. The same adjustment is made for each
demographic type. 55 We model the intercept as a function of the black share of
each county's population, because much previous research suggests that whites
are less tolerant of blacks where the black population is larger.156 Additionally,
in one version of the model, we include a unique identifier for each state in the
intercept regression. The underlying assumption is that the racial attitudes of
any pair of randomly selected persons of the same demographic type are more
likely to be similar when both persons are drawn from the same state as
opposed to different states.1 57
Figure 6 depicts our results. The top panel shows the estimated
distribution of anti-black stereotyping when the state identifier is omitted from
the intercept model; the lower panel shows the distribution when the state
identifier is included. The upper panel suggests that anti-black stereotyping is
prevalent among counties in the Southern states as well as large areas of
California, New Mexico, Washington state, and Wyoming. When the state
identifier is included, we observe less within-state variation, as the intercept for

154.

For an introduction to this class of models, see GELMAN & HILL, supra note 130, at 251-

78.
155. The intercept term for any given county is a weighted average of the predicted intercept
(based on the county's black population and, in the second model, the state within which the county is
located) and the actual difference between the average reported stereotype of respondents in the county
and the predicted average stereotype given those respondents' demographics. See GELMAN & HILL,
supra note 130, at 253-59.
156. The canonical work is V.0. KEY, JR., SOUTHERN POLITICS IN STATE AND NATION
(1949).
157. For more discussion of this assumption (and corresponding evidence from our models),
see CRISTOPHER S. ELMENDORF & DOUGLAS M. SPENCER, TECHNICAL APPENDIX, THE GEOGRAPHY
OF RACIAL STEREOTYPING: EVIDENCE AND IMPLICATIONS FOR VRA "PRECLEARANCE" AFTER
SHELBY COUNTY (2014), available at http://www.dougspencer.org/research/geography-of
discrimination/s5%20Appendix.pdf
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each county is pulled toward the state's average. Notably, counties in the Deep
South have nearly identical estimates in both models.
The differences between the top and bottom panels in Figure 6 drive home
the point that county-level coverage decisions would be sensitive to modeling
assumptions. The two models presented here hardly exhaust the universe of
plausible models. For example, the second level of the model (the regression
for the intercept term) might be enriched with county-level data on residential
integration, income inequality, black poverty, and the like-although this might
result in overfitting. One could also relax the "constant slope" assumption,
allowing the effects of individual-level predictors to vary across geographic
units. 159 For example, it might be the case that Asian Americans' and Latinos'
stereotypes of blacks vary with the size of the Asian American or Latino
population in the county, or that old people in the South (but not young people
in the South) have very different racial attitudes than their demographic
counterparts in the North.
Several other caveats are in order. First, our county-level results use only
the CCAP data, because Annenberg was unable to obtain county or zip code
identifiers for its respondents. This cuts our effective sample size by more than
half, and it means that our estimates do not account for the untrustworthiness
stereotype. Second, our estimates ignore the stereotypes of persons who are
younger than twenty-five, because the Census FactFinder tables on which we
must rely for poststratification do not include people younger than twentyfive.160 Third, we cannot include age as a predictor, or differentiate between
citizens and noncitizens, because, again, this information is absent from the
FactFinder tables. 161
158. See supra note 146 and accompanying text.
159. Varying intercept/constant slope models are standard in the MRP literature, but for a
recent exception, see Ghitza & Gelman, supra note 130.
160. In addition to the FactFinder tool, the Census publishes untabulated "microdata" samples
of various sizes based on the American Community Survey. MINN. POPULATION CTR. OF THE UNIV.
OF MINN., Integrated Public Use Microdata Series, https://usa.ipums.org/usa (last visited Aug. 12,

2014). These microdata samples easily lend themselves to customization and are ideal for poststratification because they include information about the full adult population (eighteen and above) at
the individual and household level, with more than one hundred demographic and geographic
variables. Unfortunately, the smallest geographic identifier in the microdata samples are "Public Use
Microdata Areas" or PUMAs which are census-defined places (typically combinations of contiguous
counties) with at least one hundred thousand residents. The lack of finer-grained geographic identifiers
precludes our use of microdata samples for political subdivisions with less than one hundred thousand
people. Thus, one can (and should) use microdata samples to estimate prejudice at the congressional
district level, where average district size exceeds one hundred thousand. Estimates for smaller
subdivisions-counties, state legislative districts, and cities-must rely on post-stratification using data
from the American FactFinder tool, as we do here.
161. A fourth, though rather trivial, caveat is that we rely on a 5% sample that includes data
from 2005 to 2009. Five percent samples are unavailable from 2004 to 2008 and relying on the
available 3%sample would require us to drop all counties with less than twenty thousand people, or
about one third of all counties.
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Figure 6. County-level estimates of anti-black stereotyping using two
different constant slope, varying intercept MRP models. In the top map, the
county-level intercept is modeled as a function of black population share. In the
bottom map, the model for the intercept also includes a dummy variable for the
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state in which the county is located. This means that the bottom map pools
information within states, pulling the estimated intercept for each county
toward the state mean. Shading reflects the proportion of non-black residents in
each county who are in the upper quartile of the national distribution of antiblack stereotyping (i.e., who stereotype blacks more negatively than 75% of all
non-black respondents). Darker shades represent larger proportions.
These flaws aren't trivial, but they needn't be fatal either. Very good MRP
estimates of electorate opinion-validated with actual election returns-have
been created at the county and city levels using FactFinder tables for
poststratification.16 2 But before county-level estimates are used to determine
coverage, the Department of Justice should probably invest in validation
studies. For example, the Department could commission large-sample surveys
of voting-age citizens within a randomly selected subset of counties, and then
compare MRP estimates with nonparametric estimates created from the
validation-study dataset.163 The Department might also convene an expert panel
to advise on model building and to test the sensitivity of coverage decisions to
modeling assumptions.
Our purpose here is not to offer the definitive MRP model of anti-black
stereotyping at the county level. It is enough for now to provide an initial
picture of how coverage might vary if tied to county-level estimates of
stereotyping, and to introduce the model-building process.
C. Alternative Coverage Criteriaand Convergence Results
It is not our view that voter discrimination or racial stereotyping must be
the exclusive criteria for coverage. We generally agree that the formula should
also account for racial polarization in political preferences and minority
population size. 164 The latter criteria track the majority's political incentive to
discriminate on the basis of race. We argued earlier that a pure "political
incentives" formula could prove constitutionally vulnerable,' 65 but nothing in
our argument cuts against a formula that supplements the stereotyping criterion
with additional thresholds based on racially polarized voting and minority
population size. Minorities probably face an especially great risk of electoral
discrimination where the racial stereotyping and political incentives criteria for
coverage coincide.

162. See Tausanovitch & Warshaw, supra note 137; Warshaw & Rodden, supra note 134.
163. For present purposes, a "nonparametric estimate" is one that does not depend on
modeling assumptions about the demographic or geographic correlates ofpublic opinion.
164. See supraPart I.B.
165.

See id.
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Figure 7 (next page) reveals a stunningly high correlation between state
rankings by anti-black stereotyping, by racially polarized voting, and by black
population size. 16 The covered states of the Deep South are concentrated near
the top of all three rankings. One is tempted to say that Congress knew what it
was doing when it extended the putatively outdated coverage formula in 2006.
The convergence across these three criteria provides a very robust "current
conditions" rationale for continued coverage of most of the historically covered
states.' 67
Going forward, the close but not exact correspondence between these
rankings also gives Congress some useful wiggle room for political
compromise. If Congress deems the racial stereotyping criterion too incendiary
to put forward as the public face of coverage-yet still useful for justifying
coverage to the courts-Congress could cast the new coverage formula as one
primarily concerned with polarization (but which also accounts for
stereotyping). If Congress concludes for independent and perhaps basely
political reasons that certain states that rank high by polarization should not be
covered (e.g., Arkansas, Utah, West Virginia, New Jersey, and Delaware),
Congress could achieve that result by conditioning coverage on a very high
stereotyping threshold.

166. The correlation between the fifty-state rankings by anti-black stereotyping and polarized
voting is 0.78; by black population size and stereotyping, the ranking correlation is 0.42; and by
polarized voting and black population size, it is 0.52.
167. Our measure of polarized voting is derived from self-reported voting behavior in the 2008
NAES and CCAP. Because the number of black respondents was small (even zero) in some states, we
used MRP to estimate Obama's vote share among blacks at the state level. We then subtracted
Obama's white vote share in each state and reported the absolute value of the difference.
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Figure 8 illustrates how this might be done. The shaded states in each map
would be covered under various thresholds for stereotyping, black population
size, and polarized voting. A formula that required states to be in the upper
quartile by stereotyping alone would cover Texas and Wyoming, along with
eleven other states. If coverage were conditional on being in the upper quartile
by all three criteria, Texas and Wyoming would drop out. Texas, but not
Wyoming, would be brought back under coverage if the threshold for "black
population" were lowered from the upper quartile to the upper half. Thus,
although state rankings are highly correlated across the three criteria, there is
room for Congress to craft a formula that accommodates political realities as
well as current conditions that act as proxies for Fourteenth and Fifteenth
Amendment violations.

Stereotyping

Black population

Polarized voting

ALL MEASURES

Top
quarile

Figure 8. States that would be covered based on various thresholds of
three measures: (1) racial stereotyping, (2) black population, and (3) racially
polarized voting. Thick black borders represent states that were covered using
the formula in Section 4 that was invalidated in Shelby County.
D. Consistency with Previous Research

Consistency with previous research strengthens our confidence in our
findings about anti-black stereotyping. Two scholars before us have created
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state-specific estimates of old-fashioned racism, using different metrics but
reaching generally similar results. Seth Stephens-Davidowitz treated the
relative frequency of Google searches for the N-word as a proxy for anti-black
animus at the state level.' 68 The great virtue of his measure is that it's tied to
racial animus, and probably undistorted by social desirability effects. It also
strongly correlates with regions of the country where Obama underperformed
relative to Kerry.' 69 But it has limitations too: the metric says nothing about the
proportion of adult residents in each geographic unit who have searched for the
N-word. A coverage formula based on Stephens-Davidowitz's work could
conceivably punish some states for the behavior of a relatively small number of
residents who happen to search for the N-word with great frequency. Also, the
N-word measure cannot detect the mass of citizens who think blacks generally
lack the qualities found in good leaders and indeed good citizens-honesty,
intelligence, and work effort-but who are not so culturally retrograde as to
spend their time searching the internet for racist jokes.
Nonetheless, Stephens-Davidowitz's findings are broadly concordant with
ours. 170 Except for Virginia, the Southern covered states rank in the top third of
the nation by the Google-search measure of racial animus.171 They are not
clustered at the very top of the rankings as they are by our measure, but they
are still markedly worse than average. Also consistent with our results, Virginia
shows up near the middle of Stephens-Davidowitz's rankings, and Alaska and
Arizona in the lower third. 172
The other ranking of states by anti-black prejudice was compiled by
political scientist Ben Highton.' 73 Highton aggregated twenty years of public
168. See Seth Stephens-Davidowitz, The Cost of Racial Animus on a Black Presidential
Candidate: Using Google Search Data to Find What Surveys Miss (June 9, 2012) (unpublished
manuscript), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfin?abstractid=2050673.
169. Nevertheless, his measure of prejudice is electorally consequential. Stephens-Davidowitz
shows that Obama did relatively poorly compared to Kerry in media markets that are more prejudiced
than the national norm by the Google-search measure. See id. at 17-23.
170. One of us wrote a brief commentary arguing that Stephens-Davidowitz's results would
probably undermine the case for Section 5's constitutionality. See Christopher Elmendorf, Googling
the Future of the Voting Rights Act, JURIST - FORUM (June 29, 2012, 2:30 PM),
http://jurist.org/fonum/2012/06/christopher-elmendorf-voting-future.php. That conclusion relied in part
on the low ranking of Virginia, Alaska, and Arizona; in part on the high ranking of non-covered states
in Appalachia and Midwest and in part on the idea that the mere availability of state rankings by antiblack prejudice might lead the Supreme Court to hold Congress to a tougher standard for the coverage
formula's fit. Elmendorf now believes, however, that the coverage formula probably should not be
evaluated vis-A-vis Arizona and Alaska in terms of anti-black prejudice, and that the rankings reported
in this Article-which place almost all of the Deep South/covered states above most Appalachian and
Midwestern states--strongly support the formula's constitutionality even under the very demanding
normative standard implicit in the Chief Justice's questioning.
171. See Stephens-Davidowitz, supranote 168, at 24, Table Al.
172. See id.
173. See Benjamin Highton, PrejudiceRivals Partisanshipand Ideology When Explaining the
2008 PresidentialVote Across the States, 44 PS: POL. SC. & POL. 530 (2011).
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opinion surveys that asked white respondents whether they agreed or disagreed
with the statement, "I think it's all right for blacks and whites to date each
other."l74 He then disaggregated the results by state, and coded "state
prejudice" as the mean response of whites (in the state) to this survey question
over the twenty-year period. He showed that state prejudice so measured is
strongly correlated with the state-level non-black vote for Obama in 2008
(controlling for partisanship and ideology), yet does not explain voting patterns
in 2000 or 2004, when both presidential candidates were white.175
Highton's measure of prejudice is vulnerable to measurement error, and it
cannot capture over-time changes in public opinion within states.! Even so,
his results coincide quite nicely with Stephens-Davidowitz's and ours.
Highton's ranking puts all seven of the covered Southern states into the top
third by anti-black prejudice, including Virginia (ranked number fourteen).177
Arizona shows up in the lower third.178 The big anomaly is Alaska, which ranks
in the upper third by Highton's measure, 179 but in the lower third by Stephens
Davidowitz's 18 0 and ours. "Things have changed in Alaska" might be a more
apt refrain for the Chief Justice than, "Things have changed in the South."' 8 1
Additionally, Stephen Ansolabehere, Nate Persily, and Charles Stewart
have created a ranking of the states, not by racial prejudice per se but by the
difference between the share of white voters who supported Kerry in 2004 and
Obama in 2008 (as revealed by exit polls).1 82 The correlation between their
ranking and ours is strongly positive, 83 though the covered states aren't as

174. See id. at 531-32.
175. See id. at 532.
176. See id. at 534 n.5 (noting that a measure based on multiple items would improve validity);
cf Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Holder, 557 U.S. 193, 203 (2009) (warning that Section 5
"imposes current burdens and must be justified by current needs"); Ansolabehere et al., supra note 107
(showing that citizens' opinions are much more stable and ideologically coherent when measured with
multiple survey items rather than single items). Because it aggregates twenty years of data, courts
might resist efforts to ground the coverage formula on Highton's measure of prejudice, reasoning that
it does not sufficiently measure current discrimination (notwithstanding that it predicts between-state
variation in current voting patterns).
177. See Highton, supranote 173, at 534, Table 4.
178. See id.
179. See id.
180. See Stephens-Davidowitz, supra note 168.
181. "Things have changed in the South" was Roberts's assertion in Northwest Austin
Municipal Utility District No. One v. Holder, 557 U.S. 193, 202 (2009).
182. Ansolabehere et al., supranote 76, at 1422, Table 9.
183. The correlation is 0.35 overall, and 0.52 if one limits the analysis to the top thirty states
by anti-black prejudice. There is no positive relationship between prejudice and the Kerry-Obama delta
for the less-prejudiced states (the bottom twenty), suggesting that patterns of party switching in
presidential voting between the 2004 and 2008 election were not much affected by racial attitudes in
these states. We see a similar pattern when analyzing individual-level data from the 2008 NAES online
survey; there is a strong relationship between stereotyping and defection for voters who are more
prejudiced than average, and essentially no relationship for voters who are less prejudiced than
average.
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tightly clustered near the top using their metric. 84 This makes sense: while
racial stereotypes were one factor that drove party switching in presidential
voting between 2004 and 2008, other factors that varied between the states
probably contributed too.
A number of other scholars have uncovered aggregate differences between
the South and other regions, and between covered and non-covered states,
using a variety of race-related survey questions.s These studies do not yield
state-specific prejudice measures and so could not serve as inputs for a new
coverage formula. But they do corroborate that the South has remained more
prejudiced than other regions of the nation.
E. Latinos and Asian Americans

Though the VRA is commonly associated with African Americans, it has
also provided important protections for Latinos, the largest non-white minority
group in America today.' 86 Asian Americans, meanwhile, have not had as much
success bringing claims, perhaps because of less internal political cohesion.' 87
We do not, however, observe a tight correspondence between the
coverage formula invalidated in Shelby County and anti-Latino stereotyping. To
the contrary, Figure 9 suggests that there is essentially no correlation between
coverage status and anti-Latino stereotyping per the CCAP data.' 88 Note also
that levels of prejudice in several of the most extreme states (high and low) by
anti-Latino stereotyping are imprecisely estimated. This is the kind of pattern
one would find if the states don't differ very much by anti-Latino stereotyping
and outliers are mainly an artifact of sample size (i.e., the small number of
respondents from less populous states).

184. Only Louisiana, Alabama, Mississippi and Georgia are in the top ten by their ranking.
185. See, e.g., Brief of Political Science and Law Professors as Amici Curiae in Support of
Respondents at 8-11, Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013) (No. 12-96) (summarizing
aggregate differences between covered and uncovered states as revealed by racial resentment and
related questions on American National Election Survey in 2000 and 2008); Valentino & Sears, supra
note 115, at 674-75 (2005) (reviewing literature), 677-79 (showing convergence of Deep South
toward North on measures of "Jim Crow racism" but not symbolic racism or racial stereotyping); see
also Jonathan Knuckey, Racial Resentment and the Changing Partisanshipof Southern Whites, 11
PARTY POL. 5 (2005).

186. Factsfor Features: Hispanic Heritage Month 2012: Sept. 15 - Oct. 15, U.S. CENSUS
BUREAU (Aug. 6, 2012), http://www.census.gov/newsroom/releases/archives/facts forfeatures
special_editions/cbl2-ffl9.html.
187. See generally Ming Hsu Chen & Taeku Lee, Reimagining Democratic Inclusion: Asian
Americansand the Voting Rights Act, 3 U.C. IRvINE L. REv. 359 (2013).
188. We note that the NAES does not ask about stereotypes of Latinos. To test whether the
results in Figure 9 are driven by unique features of the CCAP sample, we replicated the state rankings
by anti-black stereotyping in Figure 5 using only the CCAP sample and obtained the same results
(available upon request). The congruence of state rankings holds whether we subset the data to all nonblack respondents (for anti-black stereotypes), to all non-Latinos (for anti-Latino stereotypes), or to
white respondents only.
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confidence intervals. Vertical line is average value. Data: self-identified white,
black, and Asian respondents to the 2008 CCAP survey.

We don't put great weight on these results. As noted earlier, our measure
of anti-Latino stereotyping omits trustworthiness and has not been validated
with data on preferences between Latino and non-Latino candidates.190 But
these results do raise the question of whether courts would accept a coverage
formula grounded solely in anti-black stereotyping for purposes of preclearance
denials that were intended to protect other minority groups. If Congress bases
the new coverage formula exclusively on anti-black stereotyping, a newly
189. Seesupranote92.
190. By contrast, Table I and Figure 3, supra, show a strong correlation between anti-black
stereotyping and voting against Obama.
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covered jurisdiction might challenge Section 5 as applied to instances of
alleged discrimination against Latinos. Similarly, a covered jurisdiction that
eliminates a majority-Asian American legislative district might argue that
Section 5 is unconstitutional as applied to this change, especially since Asian
Americans-in contrast to blacks and Latinos-appear to be stereotyped more
favorably than whites.191

IV.
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CONGRESS

In light of the legal arguments and empirical findings presented above, we
recommend a two-track approach to coverage. First, Congress should enact a
default coverage formula using our ranking of the states by anti-black
stereotyping. States would be covered if their non-black populations subscribe
to dim views of African Americans' work effort, intelligence, and
trustworthiness. The new coverage formula could take account of other factors
as well, such as racially polarized voting and minority population size, but
worse-than-ordinary racial stereotyping would be a necessary condition for
coverage. Second, Congress should give the Department of Justice or an
independent commission authority to update the coverage formula
prospectively. 192
The agency exercising this authority should be permitted to exclude
substate political subdivisions from coverage on the ground that electorate
prejudice in those subdivisions is no worse than the national norm. Conversely,
the agency should be able to extend coverage to political subdivisions of noncovered states if the local electorate displays a level of stereotyping comparable
to the covered states. Finally, the agency should be authorized to update the
measure of voter discrimination embodied in the coverage formula itself-to
account for new and better measures of prejudice, new evidence concerning the
correlation between racial stereotyping and political behavior, and judicial
glosses or attacks on the coverage formula. Congress should instruct the agency
to maintain a close connection, in fact and appearance, between the coverage
formula and actual or likely race discrimination in violation of the Fourteenth
and Fifteenth Amendments.
The administrative process we contemplate would bear a loose
resemblance to the judicial "bail in" and "bailout" procedures found in Sections
191. See Figure 2, supra.
192. Because the Attorney General serves at the President's pleasure, the independent
commission could be located within the Department of Justice if Congress so desires. Cf Free Enter.
Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 130 S. Ct. 3138 (2010) (holding that Congress cannot
create a double layer of political insulation by putting an independent agency within an independent
agency). For design ideas about independent commissions with electoral responsibilities, see
Christopher S. Elmendorf Representation Reinforcement Through Advisory Commissions: The Case
ofElection Law, 80 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1366 (2005).
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3 and 4 of the VRA-but with some important differences. The crux of Section
4 is that a jurisdiction may escape coverage (bail out) if, during the preceding
ten years, the jurisdiction and its political subdivisions have neither faced any
preclearance objections from the Department of Justice, nor have lost or settled
any lawsuits under the VRA or the race-discrimination provisions of the
Constitution.'9 3 The jurisdiction seeking bailout must also satisfy the court that
it has engaged in constructive efforts to better incorporate minorities into the
political process and has abated any vestiges of discrimination.' 94 The bail-in
provision of Section 3 allows a court that finds intentional racial discrimination
by a non-covered jurisdiction to compel coverage as part of the remedy.1 95
Unlike the existing bailout and bail-in provisions, our administrative
mechanism for updating coverage would base changes on the same criteria
employed to determine coverage initially. This distinction is important. Many
observers were puzzled by the Shelby County Court's failure to discuss the
bailout and bail-in mechanisms, which make Section 5 more responsive to
current conditions than it initially appears. 96 But the Court's disregard for
these procedures is understandable if, as we suggested above, the Court's main
concern was the facial legitimacy of the coverage formula.197 The coverage
formula had an appearances problem because it was based on old data, and
because the dynamic aspects of coverage ("bailout" and "bail in") were not
linked to the criteria that purportedly legitimized coverage in the first instance
(voter registration and turnout). If low turnout justifies coverage, why not tie
bailout and bail-in to turnout? Conversely, if a lack of Department of Justice
objections and Section 2 settlements legitimizes bailout, why not link coverage
to risk factors for vote dilution? The mechanism we propose would solve the
appearances problem by grounding the initial basis for coverage and
subsequent exit from and entry to coverage in the same criteria.198
The importance of an administrative mechanism for updating coverage is
hard to overstate. The evidence in Part III suggests that most of the currently
covered states rank high for anti-black stereotyping but not for anti-Latino
stereotyping. We would not be surprised if the Roberts Court were to hold that
a coverage formula based on anti-black stereotyping cannot sustain Section 5 as
193. Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, § 4, 79 Stat. 437 (codified as amended at
42 U.S.C. § 1973b (2006)). In addition to being completely clean in these respects, the jurisdiction
must also show that it has engaged in "constructive efforts" to facilitate political participation by
minorities. Id. § 1973b(a)(1)(F) (2006).
194. 42 U.S.C. § 1973b(a)(1)(F).
195. Voting Rights Act § 3,42 U.S.C. § 1973a(c) (2006). For more on the bail-in mechanisms,
see Crum, supra note 36.
196. Justin Levitt has made this point especially forcefully. See Justin Levitt, Section 5 as
Simulacrum, 123 YALE L.J. ONLINE 151 (2013); Justin Levitt, supra note 36.

197. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
198. Of course, Congress might still allow jurisdictions with a coverage-worthy propensity for
voter discrimination to escape coverage on additional grounds such as those now provided in
Section 4.
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applied to instances of alleged discrimination or retrogression against Latino,
Native American, or Asian American voters. An administrative process for
updating the evidentiary basis of the coverage formula would make the
prospect of this holding much less threatening, as the agency charged with
updating the formula could commission new studies of voter discrimination
against these groups and extend coverage to new states or subdivisions based
on its findings.
V.
WHAT IF CONGRESS DOES NOTHING? JUDICIAL BAIL-IN REMEDIES UNDER
SECTION 3

Perhaps the most likely congressional response to Shelby County is
capitulation.' 99 A Congress polarized on ideological and partisan lines may be
incapable of reaching agreement on revisions to the coverage formula, even if
the revisions would not much change the states subject to preclearance.
If Congress does not act, civil rights litigators will try to put Section 5
back to work via Section 3 "bail in" remedies. 200 As noted above, Section 3 of
the VRA empowers district courts to compel otherwise non-covered states or
political subdivisions to enter the preclearance regime, if the court "finds that
violations of the fifteenth amendment justifying equitable relief have occurred
within the territory of such State or political subdivision." 20 1
Section 3 case law is sparse, presumably because there was little incentive
to litigate potential constitutional violations and seek bail-in remedies in the
202
State action that violates the Constitution also
pre-Shelby County era.
violates Section 2, and it is easier to prove a Section 2 violation. 203 So at a time
when most jurisdictions with exceptional propensities for discrimination were
covered via Section 4, plaintiffs had little reason to bring constitutional claims
and seek bail-in remedies. But keen observers expect a flurry of bail-in
litigation after Shelby County.204
There are many open questions under Section 3, such as whether multiple
constitutional violations are necessary before a court may impose the

199. For one pessimistic prognostication to this effect, see Hasen, supra note 5, at 23-24.
200. Days after Shelby County, civil rights groups that had intervened in litigation over
Texas's 2010 redistricting sought leave to counterclaim for bail-in under Section 3. See DefendantIntervenors' Motion for Leave to File Amended Answer and Counterclaim, State of Texas v. United
States, No. 1:1 1-cv-1303 (RMC-TBG-BAH) (D.D.C. July 3, 2013), available at http://electionlaw
blog.org/wp-content/uploads/241-motion-sec-3redux.pdf
201. Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, § 3(c), 79 Stat. 437, 437-38 (1965).
202. See Crum, supra note 36, at 2010-15 (chronicling history of bail-in litigation).
203.
204.

See generally Elmendorf,Making Sense ofSection 2, supra note 6.
See, e.g., Levitt, supra note 36.
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preclearance remedy;205 whether preclearance should be limited to the
particular type of law found to violate the Constitution or applied more
broadly; 206 and whether preclearance may extend to units of government other
than the unit found to have violated the Constitution. 207 Given Section 3's
reference to "equitable relief' and its lack of detail, we expect many courts to
adopt the open-ended balancing framework of Jeffers v. Clinton, the leading
Section 3 case.208 Under Jeffers, a court considering bail-in must ask:
* Have the [constitutional] violations been persistent and
repeated?
* Are they recent or distant in time?
* Are they the kinds of violations that would likely be
prevented, in the future, by preclearance?
* Have they already been remedied by judicial decree or
otherwise?
* How likely are they to recur?
* Do political developments, independent of this litigation,
make recurrence more or less likely? 209
After weighing these considerations, the court decides whether to issue a bail-in
remedy and how to delimit its geographic scope (which units of government are
covered), topical scope (which election practices and procedures are covered),
and temporal scope (how long the remedy will last).210
Though Shelby County did not address Section 3, it casts a long shadow.
Per Shelby County, preclearance is an "extraordinary" remedy that can only be
justified by "exceptional" conditions.211 In effect, Shelby County boils the
Jeffers factors down to this:
* Is the threat of constitutional violations in the defendant
jurisdiction sufficiently exceptional to warrant, by way of
remedy, an "extraordinary departure from the traditional

205. See Crum, supra note 36, at 2007 ("One district court has held that section 3 requires
multiple constitutional violations, but other courts have imposed preclearance through consent decree
without addressing the issue.").
206. See Pildes, supra note 36 (describing the potential for narrowly defining the types of
measures subject to preclearance as a benefit of Section 3); see also Jeffers v. Clinton, 740 F. Supp.
585 (E.D. Ark. 1990) (limiting preclearance to majority-vote requirements for at-large and
multimember district elections, which the court found to have been adopted on four occasions with a
discriminatory purpose).
207. Cf Jeffers, 740 F. Supp. at 600 ("We agree with plaintiffs that both State and local
violations of the voting guarantees of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments must be taken into
account. The statute does not say that the State or its officials must be guilty of the violations, but only
that the violations must 'have occurred within the territory' of the State.").
208. 740 F. Supp. 585.
209. Id. at 601.
210. See Crum, supra note 36, at 2006-17 (summarizing cases).
211. See Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013) (reiterating these points).
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course of relations between the States and the Federal
Government"? 212
Because of Shelby County, it will be difficult for courts to justify broad bail-in
remedies unless plaintiffs establish that the situation in the defendant
jurisdiction really is exceptional.
Here our results come into play. We have shown systematic differences
between the states with respect to three risk factors for Fourteenth and Fifteenth
Amendment violations: racial stereotyping, racially polarized voting, and
minority population size. We have also demonstrated that states at risk of
violating the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments according to any one of
these criteria are usually at risk per the other criteria too. The same arguments
that would justify Congress relying on our findings to craft a generic coverage
formula would equally justify judicial reliance on our findings for bail-in
decisions about particular states or political subdivisions.
Were it not for our results, judges crafting bail-in remedies under Section
3 would probably feel compelled by Shelby County to draft the remedy
narrowly-covering only the particular unit of government found to have
violated the Fourteenth or Fifteenth Amendment and the particular type of law
that that government used to burden minority participation. Our results should
enable courts to recreate some semblance of a broad coverage regime through
state-specific bail-in rulings.
One final point is worthy of remark. In ordinary constitutional litigation,
plaintiffs must prove it "more likely than not" that a discrete state action
violated the Constitution. 2 13 But for purposes of bail-in remedies under Section
3, the requisite "find[ing] [of] violations of the [F]ourteenth or [F]ifteenth
[A]mendment justifying equitable relief' might be established rather
differently.214 Imagine that political subdivisions in the defendant jurisdiction
independently undertook one hundred somewhat suspicious actions, such as
redistricting that disadvantages a minority community. Or, if one accepts
Elmendorf's account of the electorate as a state actor for certain purposes,215
imagine one hundred separate elections in the defendant jurisdiction, each with
racially polarized voting. After tracing the history of these state actions and
weighing information about racial stereotyping, racially polarized voting, and
minority population size in the defendant jurisdiction, the court concludes that
the odds of an unconstitutional outcome are roughly one in ten for each
occurrence of the state action (i.e., for each election outcome). Applying the
212. Id at 12 (quoting Presley v. Etowah Cnty. Comm'n, 502 U.S. 491, 500-01 (1992)).
213. See Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 423-24 (1979) (describing typical
"preponderance of the evidence" standard for civil cases and noting that exceptions with higher
standards of proof have been created only where the government seeks to deprive an individual of
"particularly important ... interests").
214. 42 U.S.C. § 1973a(c) (2006).
215.

See Elmendorf,Making Sense ofSection 2, supra note 6, at 428-48.
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more likely than not standard, the court should further conclude that at least
nine constitutionalviolations occurred.2 16 It may be impossible to say whether

any one of the one hundred state actions violated the Constitution, but it
follows from the court's judgment of probabilities that the odds of at least nine
constitutional violations exceed 0.50.217
To be sure, it doesn't follow that there are exceptional circumstances in
the defendant jurisdiction, which warrant the "extraordinary" remedy of
preclearance. Our point, rather, is that very same risk factors that may justify
broad preclearance remedies under Section 3 are also relevant at the liability
stage of bail-in cases. They are pertinent not because Section 3 relaxes the
evidentiary standard for constitutional violations to something looser than
"more likely than not," 218 but because the Section 3 question is whether
violations that might justify bail-in occurred, not whether this or that state
action should be enjoined because it was probably unconstitutional. The
threshold question in a Section 3 case-whether it is more likely than not that
violations occurred-will often have an affirmative answer if many state
actions took place, each with small positive probability of violating the
Constitution. Once this hurdle has been cleared, the court can decide whether
the violations warrant equitable relief in the form of a preclearance remedy, and
if so, the appropriate scope of the remedy.
We recognize that it may not be feasible to quantify precisely the risk of
Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendment violations in states that rank high by antiblack stereotyping, racially polarized voting, and minority population size. 2 19
216. This follows from the binomial distribution, assuming that the state actions are
independent, (i.e., that the realization of unconstitutional motives in one action does not affect the
probability of unconstitutional motives in another action). The binomial distribution gives the
probability of at least x "successes" occurring in n trials, where trial outcomes are binary ("success" or
"failure"), the probability of success is fixed across trials, and the n trials are independent. In our
example, the trials consist of 100 elections, "success" is an unconstitutional election outcome, and the
probability of "success" in each trial is 0.10.
217. It is worth noting that the considerations that led Elmendorf to argue that federal courts
may not adjudicate the question of whether particular election outcomes are unconstitutional because
of electorate prejudice do not apply to Section 3 bail-in proceedings. Elmendorf showed that several
strands of the political question doctrine cut strongly against federal court efforts to review and remedy
the outcomes of particular elections. See Elmendorf, Making Sense of Section 2, supra note 6, at 43648. But in a bail-in proceeding, a court would not have to pass on whether particular incumbent
officials were impermissibly elected (see the above discussion of probabilities), nor would it have to
"undo" the outcome of particular elections. Rather, without passing on whether the outcome of any
particular election "rested on prejudice," the court could look at racial stereotyping, the correlation
between stereotyping and behavior, racially polarized voting, minority population size, electoral
competitiveness, and so forth, and then hazard a guess at the probability of prejudiced votes providing
the margin of victory in any given election. Once this average or typical probability has been
estimated, and once the total number of elections in the sample is known, it is easy to estimate the
probability that at least Xunconstitutional outcomes occurred.
218. For an argument that Section 2 does relax evidentiary standards in this way, see
Elmendorf, Making Sense ofSection 2, supra note 6, at 377, 404.

219. Put differently, the outcome of bail-in cases will depend on the judge's prior beliefs about
the probability of unconstitutional race discrimination in the defendant jurisdiction. But prior beliefs
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But this should not forestall the courts from recognizing either (1) the laws of
probability (i.e., that events with small positive probability do occur with
predictable frequencies in large samples), or (2) the fact that the type of
"finding of constitutional violation" needed to justify an injunction against a
particular instance of state action is wholly different from the type of finding
that may justify the procedural remedy of preclearance. Evidence concerning
the present and future risk of constitutional violations throughout a jurisdiction
says much more about whether bail-in is warranted than does documentation of
particular constitutional violations that have been remedied in the past.
CONCLUSION

The Supreme Court has invited Congress to craft a new coverage formula
for the VRA's preclearance regime that is expressly grounded in current
conditions. Meshing legal arguments with empirical evidence about the
geography of racial stereotyping, we have shown that Congress could create a
new coverage formula based on citizens' racial attitudes (1) that would cover
most of the states historically subject to the preclearance regime; (2) that need
not reach many (or indeed any) of the states not historically covered; and
(3) that would be closely connected on its face to geographic disparities in the
likelihood of Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendment violations. The first two
factors speak to the political advantages of our approach, 220 and the third means
that it should survive judicial review. We have also shown that if Congress
does not act, courts and litigants could use our results to recreate some
semblance of the preclearance regime through the bail-in provisions of Section
3. Our findings should enable courts to issue broader bail-in remedies than
could otherwise be justified, and they may help courts decide whether it is more
likely than not that constitutional violations occurred.

affect the outcomes of many other cases, too. See generally RICHARD A. POSNER, How JUDGES
THINK (2008).
220. Efforts to revise the coverage formula in 2006 floundered because of political opposition
from jurisdictions that would have become newly covered. See Persily,supranote 17, at 209-11.

